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Local Jihad:

Radical Islam and terrorism in Indonesia

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

September 2005

Greg Fealy

Greg Fealy holds a joint appointment as research fellow and lecturer in Indonesian politics at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, and the Faculty of Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra. His main research interests are Islam and post-independence Indonesian politics. He is currently studying Islamic neo-revivalism and terrorism in Indonesia, as well as the impact of globalisation upon religio-political behaviour. Greg gained his PhD from Monash University in 1998 with a study of the history of Indonesia's largest Islamic party, recently published in Indonesian as *Ijtihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah NU, 1952–1967*. He is the co-editor of *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditionalism and Modernity in Indonesia* and *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation*. He was the CV Starr Visiting Professor in Indonesian Politics at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC, semester one, 2003. Greg has also worked as an Indonesia analyst at the Office of National Assessments and as a consultant to AusAID, The Asia Foundation, USAID, BP and the Lowy Institute.

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Cover image: Indonesian Muslim supporters of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir gather outside the courthouse for the verdict in the Muslin cleric's trial in Jakarta, 2 September 2003.
AFP via AAP/Choo Youn-Kong © 2003 AFP

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

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ASPI
AUSTRALIAN
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First published September 2005

Published in Australia by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

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Fealy, Greg, 1957– .
Local Jihad: radical Islam and terrorism in Indonesia

ISBN 1 920722 65 3

1. Terrorism—Indonesia. 2. Terrorism—Religious aspects—Islam. 3. Islam and politics—Indonesia.
4. Indonesia—Politics and government. I. Borgu, Aldo. II. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. III. Title.

303.62509598

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Director's introduction

Terrorism as we recognise it today has been a focus of international policies and security since at least the late 1960s. Suicide bombings and jihadist terrorism date back at least twenty years. Even the use of violence by radical Islamists within Indonesia isn't a new or recent phenomenon.

What has changed for Australia is that our country and citizens are now a clearly identified target of such violence. The bombings in Bali in 2002 and against the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004 underlined that reality. Well before those attacks, Australia had identified itself as a formal partner in the US's global war on terror (GWOT). However some degree of uncertainty exists as to whether our campaign against Jemaah Islamiah (JI) forms part of our actual contribution to the GWOT.

The term 'global war on terror' doesn't provide the clarity required about what we're trying to combat—the ideology of radical Islam, or one of its tactics, namely terrorism. Despite popular perceptions to the contrary, not all terrorists in Indonesia are radical Islamists and not all radical Islamists in Indonesia are terrorists. We need to be clear in our own minds about the threat we're designing our policies to defeat. If we aren't clear, we might end up feeding the very threat we're attempting to eliminate, or possibly ignoring a real long-term threat while we concentrate on a short-term one. It may be more accurate to describe the global war on terror as forming just one plank of Australia's counter-terrorism policy, rather than describing the totality of our policy.

Reflecting these issues this ASPI report looks at the 'threat' to Australia from two perspectives. The first, written by Dr Greg Fealy from the ANU, explores the ideology of radical Islam in Indonesia and assesses its historical basis, current state and future prospects. The focus is on Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), but the report recognises that JI is unlikely to be the only future threat we face, so wider radical Islamist movements

Photo opposite: Indonesian Christians from Sulawesi island call for an end to the violence between Muslims and Christians during a demonstration in Jakarta, Indonesia, 10 December 2001. AP via AAP/Charles Dharapak © 2001 AP

in Indonesia have also been considered. The second part of the report looks at the use of terrorism as a tactic, exploring its connection to the ideology of radical Islam and sets out the policy implications for Australia and options and recommendations for Australian Government responses. Aldo Borgu, who manages ASPI's research on terrorism issues, authored this part of the report.

Terrorism might be a global problem, but for Australia the threat is inextricably tied up with the problems of the future stability of our neighbours, particularly Indonesia. This report reveals that, while groups like JI may have global links, their motivations, recruiting and operations are based on regional issues. That's also the conclusion of the Australian Government's Terrorism White Paper, which states that 'it is in our own region where Australia has its greatest commitment and contribution to make' in combating terrorism. Australia has a number of policies and initiatives in place to deal with the threat of terrorism but it's arguable whether we have a comprehensive long-term regional strategy.

In keeping with ASPI's tradition and charter, our aim has been to produce a report with a whole-of-government perspective as a useful addition to the work of government departments and agencies, and to add fresh insights on critical issues confronting the government.

My thanks go to Greg Fealy for his original insights on the history and prospects of radical Islam in Indonesia, to Aldo Borgu for his analysis of the future of terrorism and his overall management of the study, and to Janice Johnson for her usual high standard in ensuring the quality of ASPI's publications.

Responsibility for the views expressed in this report rests with the authors and me.

Peter Abigail
Director

Executive summary

The Bali bombings of October 2002 and the subsequent further uncovering of the extensive terrorist network of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have produced a more profound questioning of earlier assumptions about the nature of Indonesian Islam. Many see violent radical Islamism in Indonesia as a relatively recent phenomenon, but a closer look at modern Indonesian history shows that this view is mistaken. For more than two hundred years, small sections of the archipelago's Muslim community have been drawn to severely puritanical and militant expressions of the faith, and some highly militant movements have been prepared to use violence to achieve their goals.

Contemporary Indonesian radicalism is a complex mix of local and international factors, as well as religious, political and economic elements. Most radical Muslims believe that Islam has been marginalised and oppressed in Indonesia and that potent domestic and international forces are determined to deny Islam its rightful place at the centre of national life.

External factors have exerted a stronger influence on Indonesian radicalism since the late 1970s. Perhaps the most important development in the context of this paper was the internationalisation of *jihad* that took place from the late 1970s, culminating in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan during the 1980s. In addition to the *mujahidin* factor, increasing numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims have received their education in the Middle East. They have been exposed to more puritanical and radical expressions of the faith, such as Salafi and Wahabi thinking from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen.

Darul Islam

Darul Islam (DI) is the oldest of Indonesia's radical Islamist movements. It began its armed rebellion in West Java in late 1948. From DI's earliest days, its rhetoric was strongly jihadist and its ideology was absolutist. Most of the DI rebellion was crushed in the early 1960s by the Indonesian Army. The cost of the rebellion was enormous: an

estimated 20,000–40,000 people lost their lives, about one million others were evacuated, over half a million properties were destroyed and the economic disruption in DI-affected areas was extensive.

DI's revival began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as former members in West Java began to reactivate the movement covertly. Violent attacks were rare immediately after the organisation's revival, but this began to change in the mid-1980s as growing numbers of DI cadres were attracted to more militant operations. This pattern of jihadist behaviour prompted Sidney Jones to write that, if there's to be any replacement of Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, the chances are that it will have DI roots.

Jemaah Islamiyah

JI is the largest and most sophisticated terrorist network in Southeast Asia and also the region's only genuinely transnational jihadist movement. While Indonesia is the main operational base of JI and provides the bulk of its leadership and membership, the organisation has also had active cells in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The 2002 Bali attack marked a major increase in JI's terrorist capacity. Not only was the size and sophistication of the main bomb far greater than anything previously attempted, it was also detonated by a suicide bomber—the first time JI had used this method. Further suicide car-bombings followed, this time in Jakarta, with attacks on the JM Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003, which killed ten Indonesians and one Dutchman, and on the Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004, which killed eleven Indonesians.

As much as JI sees itself as part of a broader global jihadist movement, it also regards itself as the heir to Darul Islam. DI's armed struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia and its members' sacrifice in the name of jihad during the 1950s and 1960s make it an inspiration for JI members today. Despite its fragmentation and internecine strife, DI is likely to continue to produce fanatical recruits for JI or other terrorist organisations for many years to come. Using data from several sources, it's possible to conclude that DI's active membership may be several tens of thousands.

JI has been hit hard in the crackdown by the Indonesian police and intelligence services after the Bali bombings. Up to half of the organisation's leaders have been arrested or are fugitives. JI has nonetheless shown considerable resilience and capacity for adaptation to this new, and much less congenial, environment. One of the more interesting developments within JI over the past two years has been a deepening rift between those who favour continued large-scale terrorist attacks and those who want more emphasis on proselytisation, education and recruitment. The seriousness of this dispute remains a matter of debate for JI analysts. It would be wrong, however, to assume that a divided JI would mean a greatly reduced terrorist threat. The more important issue is the strength and extent of the jihadist network, of which JI has been a central player. If JI is fragmenting, this may result in a more diffuse pattern of terrorist activity, rather than one focused on a single organisation.

JI continues to be a significant threat to Australian citizens and assets. The organisation regards Australians as legitimate targets for several reasons. First, Australia is seen as part of the 'West', and thus as an enemy of Islam. This antipathy is heightened by our close alliance with the US. Second, Australia is seen as having orchestrated East Timor's separation from

Indonesia as part of its supposed hegemonic designs on Muslim majority nations in the region. Third, Australia's post-Bali collaboration with the Indonesian police in investigating JI attacks and hunting down its members has further raised the ire of JI leaders.

Indonesian responses

Indonesian Government policies on terrorism have changed markedly since the Bali bombings. Before October 2002, successive post-Soeharto governments were either doubtful of the nature of the terrorist threat or reluctant to act against it for fear of a backlash from the Muslim community. Following the Bali bombings, the Megawati Government's responses improved dramatically. The Indonesian Government has allowed unprecedented cooperation between Indonesian police and intelligence agencies and their foreign counterparts, in particular Australia, and over the past two years has prosecuted and convicted more terrorists than any other national government. Other, more politically sensitive, aspects of the fight against terrorism have been less adequately dealt with.

Foremost among these shortcomings was the failure of both the Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) governments to explain the nature of the terrorism threat to the Indonesian public, especially as it relates to JI and other terrorist groups. As a result, most Indonesians are ambivalent about the threat. The lack of public understanding of JI as an organisation and a violent subculture within Indonesian Islam militate against broader government counter-terrorism actions, such as measures against schools that teach virulent jihadism. Another shortcoming has been the government's tardiness in proscribing JI. The government has pointed to difficulties in proscribing an organisation with a name as common as Jemaah Islamiyah, and while there's some justification for this view, the problem is not insurmountable. The government's unwillingness to tackle proscription points to the issue's political sensitivity.

SBY, despite his many promises to Western officials to ramp up Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts, is unlikely to embark on bold new initiatives. One reason for this is the fear that stronger measures against JI and other terrorist groups might open the government to accusations of being anti-Islamic and a tool of the West's 'war on terror'. In short, there's likely to remain a substantial gap between the SBY Government's rhetoric on terrorism and its actions. Nonetheless, if SBY continues to support the ongoing police and intelligence operations against JI, it's reasonable to expect further arrests of would-be terrorists and the foiling of planned operations.

Declining radicalism?

The immediate post-Soeharto years were undoubtedly a time of resurgence for Indonesian radical Islamism. The number of radical groups grew rapidly, accompanied by a dramatic rise in recruitment, fundraising and public profile. Since late 2002, however, the radical revival has stalled and gone into reverse. Radical organisations and media outlets have suffered a succession of setbacks, which they have either struggled or failed to overcome. These groups also had reason to be disappointed with the wider Indonesian response to the US-led Iraq War. As well, local communities in Central Sulawesi and Maluku have largely resisted being drawn into renewed Muslim–Christian violence. This is a source of frustration to militant leaders who believe that religious conflict, particularly perceived anti-Muslim attacks, have a radicalising effect that helps recruitment and fundraising.

Another concern for radical groups has been the shift in community attitudes to them. Many Indonesians are now more inclined to see militant rhetoric as irresponsible and inflammatory. Mainstream Islamic leaders, especially those of more moderate persuasion, have helped to bring about this change by reasserting what they see as the essentially tolerant and pluralist teachings of their faith.

Islamic radicalism has been part of Indonesian political and religious life since independence, and it's likely to remain so. The more important question is to what extent violence becomes a feature of radical behaviour. In the past, political repression, socioeconomic deprivation and cultural alienation, as well as stimuli from elsewhere in the Islamic world, have all contributed to periodic rises in Islamic violence in Indonesia.

With the important exception of JI-related terrorist violence, this cycle appears to be on a downward trend, but a sharp deterioration in the economy, renewed Muslim–Christian conflict or large-scale shedding of Muslim blood elsewhere in the world could reverse this and create favourable conditions for rising radicalism.

Events since 1998 have demonstrated that Indonesia isn't immune from the broader currents that have shaped Islam throughout its history.

The Australian response

The Australian Government's response to the threat posed to Australia by international terrorism is outlined in two publications: *Protecting Australia Against Terrorism*, released by the Prime Minister in June 2004; and, the White Paper, *Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia*, released by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in July 2004. Together these documents, supported by more than one hundred measures initiated by the government so far, provide the essence of the current national strategy, which is characterised as a 'global campaign against terrorism'.

The strategy concentrates on the provision of domestic security in Australia, but the need for sustained action in the international domain is also addressed, although with less clarity in terms of activities and resources.

Fighting a 'global campaign against terrorism' will require discrete responses to different terrorist threats in different parts of the world; this is not a campaign in which 'one size fits all'. And rather than Australia's counter-terrorism strategy forming part of the overall 'global war on terror' (GWOT) it's the GWOT that forms just one small plank of our overall counter-terrorism strategy. The GWOT has limited application in determining what our response should be to counter extremist Islamic terrorism in Indonesia.

The fight to combat JI and like organisations will not be fought in Australia, or even primarily by Australia. As the threat posed by JI is more a terrorist campaign than an effective insurgency, it follows that greater emphasis should be placed on developing the capabilities of the Indonesian police and intelligence services rather than those of the Indonesian military.

It should also be recognised that a JI that focuses on fomenting sectarian and secessionist conflict within Indonesia may be a greater threat to Australian national interests than a JI that specifically targets Australian nationals.

Australia needs a coherent long-term strategy to combat the threat posed by jihadist terrorism in Indonesia and the wider region. The strategy needs to go beyond the broad objectives outlined in published documents and address in more detail the range of enabling initiatives that will contribute to their achievement.

Recommendations

Strategy

1. Australia should develop a coherent long-term strategy to combat the threat posed by jihadist terrorism in Indonesia and the wider region. The strategy needs to go beyond the broad objectives outlined in the published documents and address the range of enabling initiatives that will contribute to their achievement.
2. The basis and framework of such a strategy should be to:
   - clearly identify and define what it is we are fighting, the tactic of terrorism, or the ideology of radical Islam, or both
   - recognise the nature of the threat we face
   - work out appropriate long term and interdisciplinary initiatives to fight it
   - develop tangible measures of success, and
   - have a clear sense of what achieving victory might mean.

Intelligence

3. Threat assessments need to take into account a more diverse regional terrorist threat but particularly within Indonesia itself. The potential for more local and seemingly less professional militant groups to broaden their experience and objectives needs to be kept under watch.
4. Recognising that gaining a better understanding of the terrorist threat is an area that needs more attention, 'red teaming' should be introduced in terrorism analysis. This would involve setting up teams of analysts to think like terrorists, and could be conducted within existing government agencies or through contracted arrangements.

5. The government should also develop some form of ongoing empirical study of the backgrounds, motivations and recruitment of known JI members. Once developed, this information could be the basis for a regionally shared database on terrorism. This could take the form of a regional capacity-building exercise.

Attitudes and ideas

6. In attempting to wage a 'battle of ideas' we need to be realistic as to what can be achieved. Western countries do not necessarily have an ideological alternative to offer those attracted to the jihadist's view of the world. Even cultivating moderate Muslims may not be enough. Consideration should be also given to engaging some of the more fundamentalist Islamic scholars and organisations who object to the use of terrorism.
7. The government should consider the development of an 'Indonesian Attitudes Project' to provide baseline data and analysis on the Indonesian population's attitudes to terrorism, Australia, and the role of Islam in public policy. Once such a survey of Indonesian opinion has been established, the next priority should be to develop a suitable public diplomacy strategy.
8. The government should consider the development of a well-funded, targeted and extensive research program extended to universities, research institutes and individuals on a wide range of topics to enable a better understanding of radical Islamism and terrorism.

Capacity building

9. Capacity-building within the region should remain a key priority of the government's regional strategy. The government should review and expand the current Defence Cooperation Program with Indonesia. A priority area for development would be an expanded maritime cooperation program, including assistance to provide additional naval craft to patrol Indonesia's maritime approaches and borders.
10. In many countries, the lack of intelligence coordination has been a major obstacle to effective counter-terrorism. As part of its capacity-building activities the Australian Government should encourage the development and improvement of relations between intelligence agencies in Indonesia.
11. Recognising that the wider Indonesian community is the audience our efforts should be directed towards, the Australian Government needs to show a fair degree of public patience towards how the Indonesian Government deals with its terrorist threat.

Radical Islam in Indonesia: history, ideology and prospects

Dr Greg Fealy

The events of the past six years have prompted a dramatic reassessment of Indonesian Islam. What was once widely seen as one of the most tolerant and benign expressions of Islam in the Muslim world has recently come to be regarded as having more malign qualities. This process began with revelations that a number of Southeast Asians, including several Indonesians, had consorted with and assisted al-Qaeda operatives involved in the 9/11 attack. The Bali bombing of October 2002 and the subsequent uncovering of Jemaah Islamiyah's extensive terrorist network produced a more profound questioning of earlier assumptions about the nature of Indonesian Islam. Many see this violent radicalism as a relatively recent phenomenon, but a closer look at modern Indonesian history shows the inaccuracy of this view. For more than 200 years, sections of the archipelago's Muslim community have been drawn to severely puritanical and militant expressions of the faith, and small but highly militant movements have been prepared to use violence to achieve their goals.

Although there's now an extensive literature available on Islamic radicalism and terrorism, such groups in Indonesia have been relatively little studied. Much of the literature published to date has taken one of two forms:

- works written by terrorism experts and journalists, few of whom have a background in Indonesian or Islamic studies, and who often rely heavily on intelligence documents and briefings
- studies by Indonesian or Islamic experts based primarily on in-country, on-the-ground research.

The first category is by far the largest and includes authors such as Rohan Gunaratna (2002), Zachary Abuza (2003) and Maria Ressa (2003). The second category is dominated by Sidney Jones and her

Photo opposite: An Indonesian Muslim woman holds a portrait of radical Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir during a protest against his detention, 1 November 2002. AP via AAP/ Dita Alangkara © 2002 AP

small team of specialist researchers at the International Crisis Group (ICG). Both categories of literature have produced valuable information, though many works in the first group are marred by errors of detail and misunderstandings of key concepts and movements within Islam. The ICG reports, by contrast, have offered authoritative, highly detailed and cutting-edge accounts of regional terrorism and radicalism.

... Western perceptions of radical Islam have been somewhat distorted by the post-9/11 preoccupation with terrorism ...

This paper doesn't seek to summarise or retrace material already set out in the above works. Rather, its aim is to provide a broader perspective on Indonesian radicalism. The starting point is that Western perceptions of radical Islam have been somewhat distorted by the post-9/11 preoccupation with terrorism, and that a fuller understanding of the factors driving terrorist and other forms of radical behaviour is only possible if we consider a range of historical, doctrinal, political and socioeconomic aspects.

The paper describes the general features of Indonesian radical groups before closely examining two of the most important and militant movements: Darul Islam (DI) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). These represent different aspects of Indonesian radicalism, but also illustrate the ways in which Islamic extremism has evolved and developed over the past fifty-five years. DI has been the most enduring radical movement in Indonesian history and has also been responsible for greater loss of life and property than any other armed rebellion or insurgency. JI sees itself as the successor to DI, as the movement that develops DI ideals and takes them to their logical conclusion. JI has greater destructive power than any preceding movement and has carried out numerous terrorist attacks in Indonesia over the past four years. Attention is given not just to JI, but also the web of relationships it has formed with other, more localised groups in Indonesia. The nature and seriousness of the threat posed to Australia by Indonesian radical groups will be considered. Finally, a number of other prominent radical groups, which range from non-terrorist jihadists such as Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam to non-violent groups such as Hizbut Tahrir will also be examined.

Terminology

Any discussion of Islam, especially of its radical variants, is bedevilled by disputes over the meanings of key terms and their use as descriptors of Islamic leaders and groups. Terms such as 'fundamentalist', 'Islamist', 'terrorist', 'jihadist', 'Wahabist' and 'salafist' are frequently used in different ways by different scholars and, in many cases, there's minimal consensus on their definition. The problem has become more acute since the post-9/11 proliferation of writings on Islamic extremism by terrorism scholars. Few of these scholars have expertise in Islam, and fewer still define or apply terms carefully. Bearing this in mind, the main terms used in this paper are defined as follows.

Radical Islam. Radical Islam seeks dramatic change in society and the state by the unstinting implementation of shari'a (Islamic law) and the upholding of Islamic principles. Radical Muslims tend to have a strictly literal interpretation of the Qur'an, especially those sections

relating to social relations, religious behaviour and the punishment of crimes, and also seek to adhere closely to the normative model based on the example of the Prophet Muhammad (known as the Sunnah). In this sense, most radicals might also be described as 'fundamentalists' because of their self-ascribed commitment to what they see as the fundamental teachings of their faith. Their activities can range from intellectual, missionary and political projects through to acts of violence. In general, they see the world as hostile and react to what they perceive as the threats to Islam posed by such forces as secularism, materialism, Christianisation and capitalist globalisation.

Radical Islamic groups in Indonesia fall into four categories:

- political, educational and intellectual
- vigilante
- paramilitary
- terrorist.

The first category contains those groups committed to non-violent advocacy of radical Islamic change, including Hizbut Tahrir, Hizbul Khilafah and the Ihsa at-Turots Foundation. Vigilante groups act to uphold Islamic law, particularly in halting 'sinful activities' (*kemaksiatan*) such as prostitution, gambling, sexually explicit public entertainment and alcohol consumption. Front Pembela Islam (FPI; Islamic Defenders' Front) is the best known of the vigilante groups, but Laskar Jihad has also, in the past, undertaken similar actions in various parts of the archipelago. Paramilitary groups have armed militias that they use to 'protect' the faith and Muslims from physical and moral threats. The most prominent paramilitary group has been Laskar Jihad, the militia wing of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (FKAWJ; Communication Forum for the Adherents of the Prophetic Tradition and the Community), but many other organisations have similar, if smaller, fighting units. Most sent forces to the Muslim–Christian conflict in Maluku, and several were also active in the inter-religious violence in the Poso region of Central Sulawesi. Terrorist groups are defined and discussed below.

Islamism. In recent years, this term has been used with increasing frequency and a wide variety of meanings. Broadly, Islamism means the application of Islamic principles to all aspects of life, including society, the state, culture and the economy. Islamism is most commonly used to mean political Islam, but it is more useful to regard the term as denoting a strict application of Islamic teachings and law. For example, the Islamic world includes many secular and pluralist Muslim parties that have little interest in Islamising public life or politics. By contrast, Islamist parties see the world primarily, if not exclusively, through the prism of Islam and seek to order society and the state according to Islamic principles. In an Indonesian context, parties such as the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) and the National Revival Party (PKB; Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), which are based on the religiously neutral state principles of Pancasila, could be regarded as pluralist, whereas the United Development Party (PPP; Partai Persatuan PerkembanganI) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB; Partai Bulan Bintang), which champion more extensive application of Islamic law, are seen as Islamist parties.

Salafism. This is one of the most difficult and contentious terms to define. It's been used in a variety of ways within Islam, a number of which are contested by those who describe themselves as *salafi*. Salafism is derived from the Arabic word, *salaf*, meaning 'to precede'

or 'to go before'. It's commonly used as shorthand for *as-salaf as-salih* or the 'pious ancestors'—a reference to the first three generations of the Muslim community, who are seen as paragons of proper Islamic thinking and behaviour. In one sense, most Muslims would see themselves as being in some way *salafi* as they seek to emulate some, if not all, aspects of the behaviour of the *as-salaf as-salih*. Historically, the term *salafiya* (literally, '*salaf*-like') has been applied to the early twentieth-century reform movement within Islam led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. But in recent decades the term has been used in a very specific way to describe those who regard themselves as the strictest adherents to the model set out by the early generations of Muslims (ICG 2004bc). As Kepel wrote, the *salafi* are now seen as 'those who understand the injunctions of the sacred texts in their most literal, traditional sense' (Kepel 2002:220).

Most *salafis* pursue their religious objectives through teaching, preaching and intellectual activity; only a small minority advocate violence.

The contemporary *salafi* movement is diverse and fragmented but has several notable characteristics. It generally eschews practical politics: *salafis* rarely participate in party activity or the lobbying of governments. They also reject subversive activity against a ruler or government, except in narrowly prescribed circumstances in which the state is deemed irredeemably hostile to Islam. Underlying this apolitical stance is a belief that Muslims should focus on individual morality as the key to rectifying social or political problems rather than on addressing broader systemic issues. Salafism is also socially conservative and trenchantly anti-Western. Most *salafis* pursue their religious objectives through teaching, preaching and intellectual activity; only a small minority advocate violence (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 2003; Solahudin 2004). In Indonesia, most *salafi* groups are based around educational and proselytisation institutions such as the al-Sofwah Foundation, the Ihsa at-Turots Foundation and al-Haramain al-Khairiyah. However, in recent years the largest salafist movement has been FKAWJ and its militia, Laskar Jihad.

Salafism has become closely identified with Saudi Wahabiism, though some caution is needed in treating the two as synonymous. Saudi Muslims don't use the term Wahabi to describe themselves and prefer to be known as *salafi*. Nonetheless, the term Wahabi is in common use in the Muslim world and the West, and some *salafi* groups would draw a distinction between the two. In reality, there's much overlap between Wahabi and *salafi* views on Islamic doctrine and the position of Muslims in the modern world. For their part, *salafi* groups in countries such as Indonesia regard prominent Saudi scholars and jurisprudents as the highest living authorities on Islamic law. But those who see themselves as the most strict *salafi* criticise Wahabis for what they see as their excessive adherence to the Hanbali law school. Hanbalite law has its origins in medieval jurisprudence, not directly in the earlier generations of the pious ancestors.

Salafi jihadism. The *jihadis* (that is, those who believe that violent *jihad* is the only way to achieve their goals) form an important but numerically small subcategory of salafism. This group, often referred to as *salafi jihadiyah*, has risen to prominence since the *mujahidin*

war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s. Its ideas draw on Wahabiism as well as Qutbist thought. Sayyid Qutb was a Muslim Brotherhood leader whose ideas in the later part of his life came to inspire a new generation of jihadists. His writings became a springboard for extreme interpretations regarding excommunication (*takfir*) and the justification for unrestricted *jihad* against Islam's perceived foes (Burke 2003, ICG 2004b). Included in this group is al-Qaeda, Egypt's Gama'a Islamiyya and al-Takfir wal Hijra, and Southeast Asia's Jemaah Islamiyah. There are important differences between *salafis* and *salafi jihadis*, which is discussed below in greater detail.

Indonesian Muslim hold a picture of Osama bin Laden during an anti-US rally in Jakarta, 28 September 2001. AFP via AAP/Weda © 2001 AFP

Terrorism. There's little scholarly consensus on a definition for terrorism; one author counted at least 109 different academic definitions (Schmid 1983). Some academics have argued that the term is impossible to define objectively. For the purposes of this paper, terrorism is taken to mean the calculated use of unexpected, shocking and unlawful violence against noncombatants by clandestine groups or agents with the aim of advancing a political or religious cause. The main terrorist group in Indonesia is Jemaah Islamiyah, but sections of smaller, more localised groups such as Wahdah Islamiyah, Laskar Jundullah and Mujahidin Kompak can also be seen as falling within my definition (Abuza 2003, ICG 2004a).

General characteristics of radical groups

Despite the diversity of radical movements and thinking in Indonesia, most have in common a number of perceptions of the world and Islam's position within it. This informs their ideological outlook. Radical groups believe that the Muslim world in general and Indonesia in particular confront a 'multidimensional crisis', the nature of which is simultaneously economic, political, cultural and moral. Various explanations are advanced for the crisis, but two elements predominate, one 'external' and the other 'internal'.

The external factor is that of the 'infidel' (*kafir*) West, which uses its economic and military might to subjugate and exploit the Islamic community. This is often cast in terms of a global Jewish and Christian conspiracy against Islam, driven not only by the imperatives of wealth extraction and strategic supremacy, but also by an innate hostility towards Islam. Radical Muslims believe that Jews and Christians see Islam as a threat to their faith and are bent on destroying it.

The internal factor is the harm caused by Muslim leaders who have deviated from the essential teachings of God as set out in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. This 'deviation' can take a variety of forms, from Muslims being too irresolute or willing to compromise on matters of faith to 'betraying' Islamic interests in return for material or status rewards. Radical groups enjoin Muslims to return to the 'pure' Islam of the Qur'an, the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions and the generations immediately following them.

The radical prescription for overcoming this crisis has as its central component the upholding of Islamic law. All Indonesian groups believe that comprehensive implementation of shari'a is the key to creating a pious and just society, and most are strictly literalist in their interpretation of scripture. They argue that until now shari'a has only been carried out in a partial and unsystematic way in Indonesia, as it has been largely restricted to family and inheritance law. This has meant that the full force of divine law hasn't been brought to bear on society, with the result that corruption, injustice and immorality are widespread. Only when shari'a covers all aspects of life can Indonesians escape the impiety and religious deviations that blight their lives. Most radical Muslims regard as indispensable the imposition of *hudud*—punishments, including stoning, scourging and amputation, prescribed in the Qur'an for particular crimes. Most are dismissive of 'liberal' Muslim arguments that Islamic legal interpretations should be 'contextualised' or 'modernised' in order to be more relevant to contemporary social reality.

Radical activists usually advocate the constitutional recognition of shari'a as the legal code that Muslims must follow. The struggle for special constitutional acknowledgment of Islamic law is a long and divisive one in Indonesian history, and is closely tied to the so-called 'Jakarta Charter' issue. The charter was formulated shortly before Indonesia's declaration of independence in 1945 in order to break the deadlock between Muslim leaders who wanted special constitutional recognition of Islam and those Muslims and non-Muslims who favoured a secular state. The key clause of the charter stated that Muslims were obliged to carry out Islamic law. The charter was included in the draft founding constitution but later omitted soon after the proclamation of independence on 17 August. Radical groups continue to see the charter's inclusion as the first step towards comprehensive shari'a-isation in Indonesia.

Many radical groups see the enforcement of shari'a as inextricably linked to the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. They argue that only in an Islamic state can God's law be applied in full. Most aren't formally opposed to the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, but want its basis changed from the religiously neutral doctrine of Pancasila to Islam. Some radical groups specify that the Islamic state must take the form of a caliphate. The caliphs were the successors to the Prophet Muhammad and acted as both spiritual and politico-military heads of the *umat*. The Ottoman Sultan had been recognised as caliph for centuries, but Turkey abolished the sultanate in 1923 and ended the caliphate the following year. Indonesian radical leaders have come to see the caliphate as an essential part of the original model of Islamic society (Zada 2002, Fealy 2004).

Origins of Indonesian radicalism

The Indonesian archipelago has a long history of minority Islamic radicalism. The earliest such movement of the modern era was that of the 'Padri' in West Sumatra. From the 1780s, people returning from the pilgrimage and study in the Middle East set about 'reforming' local Islamic practices and applying Islamic law more strictly in the region. They opposed gambling, the use of intoxicants, and 'un-Islamic' entertainment such as cockfighting. Their uncompromising puritanism sparked fierce resistance from the local religious and political elite and from the Dutch, and eventually led to the outbreak of the Padri Wars during the early decades of the nineteenth century.

Islam was also a powerful element in other conflicts of the colonial period, including the Java War of 1825–30, although its expression was more commonly heterodox than severely orthodox as was the case in the Padri War. Religion often became a banner around which to marshal forces whose deeper motivations were socioeconomic or political grievances. As will become clear, there were elements of this dynamic in the bloody Darul Islam rebellion from the late 1940s to the early 1960s. Thus, the assumption in some terrorism texts that Islamic radicalism is a new phenomenon in Indonesia is historically incorrect.

The Indonesian archipelago has a long history of minority Islamic radicalism.

Contemporary Indonesian radicalism is a complex mix of local and international factors as well as religious, political and economic elements. There have always been a small number of Muslims who are personally attracted to puritanical and highly formalistic variants of Islam. This can be the product of psychological make-up and religious preference as much as anything else. Even if political and economic concerns intrude little into their lives, their orientation is fervently towards Islamic orthopraxy ('correct action').

However, most radical Muslims have powerful political, social and economic grievances, and these provide motive force to their radical religiosity. Most believe that Islam has been marginalised and oppressed in Indonesia, and that potent domestic and international forces are determined to deny Islam its rightful place at the centre of national life. Radical textbooks catalogue a long series of humiliating defeats for Muslims. In politics, Muslims are portrayed as having failed to achieve most of their stated objectives. The refusal of religious minorities and 'less devout' Muslims to allow constitutional recognition of the authority of shari'a for the Islamic community (the Jakarta Charter issue) has been a constant source of vexation, with many radical writers asserting that Muslims were forced to make far greater sacrifices in the name of national unity than were other groups. They also point to the inability of Islamic parties to win a majority at any of the country's nine general elections as further evidence of failure. The hostility of the state towards Islam was apparent from 'anti-Islamic legislation' pushed through parliament, such as the 1974 Marriage Law and the 1985 'Sole Foundation' (*asas tunggal*) Law, which required all Islamic organisations to have the 'secular' Pancasila doctrine rather than Islam as their sole ideological basis. The state was also seen as fostering Christianisation and discriminating against devout Muslims in the bureaucracy and the military.

Most reprehensible of all, to radical groups, was the violent repression of Muslim dissent. The deaths of several hundred Muslims in the 1984 Tanjung Priok and 1989 Lampung incidents symbolised the state's brutality towards the Islamic community. Radicals also resented the economic sidelining of Muslims, and referred repeatedly to the fact that Muslims had a disproportionately small share of the nation's wealth and had less opportunity for career and economic advancement. Although the sense of grievance has eased in many sections of the Islamic community following the 1998 fall of the Soeharto regime and subsequent transition to democracy, radical groups remain preoccupied with these 'historical injustices' and believe that Muslims can't escape manipulation or immorality until a truly Islamic order is instituted in Indonesia.

... the internationalisation of jihad from the late 1970s, culminating in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan during the 1980s ... was critical to the rise of terrorism in Southeast Asia.

External factors have exerted a stronger influence on Indonesian radicalism since the late 1970s. There are several elements to this. The 1979 Iranian Revolution had a galvanising effect on many younger Indonesians, who viewed it as proof that Muslims could overthrow powerful and repressive Western-backed regimes and replace them with Islamic political and economic systems. In the context of this paper, perhaps the most important development was the internationalisation of *jihad* from the late 1970s, culminating in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan during the 1980s. This was critical to the rise of terrorism in Southeast Asia. Several hundred Indonesians went to Afghanistan to fight as *mujahidin*, and this had a deep impact on them. They gained skills as soldiers in arduous battlefield conditions, learned terrorist-related skills such as bomb making and running clandestine operations, and were indoctrinated with pan-Islamic and virulently anti-Western ideologies.

The experiences of the Indonesian volunteers greatly intensified their sense of global Islamic solidarity. Importantly, they were able to establish relations with Muslim radicals from across the Islamic world. These contacts would later prove invaluable in gaining financial assistance, access to technical know-how and connections into global terrorist networks. The practical effect of the '*mujahidin*-isation' of Indonesian radical groups has been a great increase in their capacity to wreak havoc and destruction—critical elements in terror campaigns. Money, explosives, technical expertise and covert operational methods were available to experienced and resourceful Afghanistan veterans and their associates. Without this direct personal experience of the war and without the networks that it fostered, Indonesian terrorist acts such as the 2002 Bali bombings would have been far more difficult to mount.

In addition to the *mujahidin* factor, increasing numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims have received their education in the Middle East, where they were exposed to more puritanical and radical expressions of the faith from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Palestine. These contacts haven't only had a powerful ideological effect; they have also proven to be lucrative sources of funding. Numerous Middle Eastern and South Asian Islamist groups have also grown rapidly in Southeast Asia in recent years.

Globalisation, particularly as it relates to the transmission of information, has had a significant effect. Cybertechnology and satellite television stations such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya have greatly increased the speed and volume of information flows to radical groups in Southeast Asia from other parts of the Islamic world. News of events affecting Muslims elsewhere, especially from areas where the Islamic community is suffering oppression, reach the region almost instantaneously. Extremist groups have become adept at harnessing new technologies to communicate their views and to urge others to join their struggle. Paramilitary groups such as Laskar Jihad have run attractive and sophisticated websites, with content in Indonesian, English and Arabic and a wide range of contact information for other radical groups (Hefner 2003, Bunt 2003). The importance of cybercommunications was apparent when the JI leader, Imam Samudra, published a web page in October 2002 calling on Indonesian Muslims to become suicide bombers.

Darul Islam

Darul Islam receives scant mention in most of the contemporary literature on Indonesian Islam. It's often regarded as primarily a historical movement with little relevance to our understanding of JI and other radical groups. With the notable exception of Sidney Jones's ICG reports, few writers on JI display a close understanding of DI's ideology and operations. This neglect of DI is regrettable, because the movement is the fountainhead of many of Indonesia's recent radical groups. While there's a debate among scholars over whether DI should be classed as a terrorist movement, there's no doubt it was violently jihadist and, as such, provided inspiration to JI.

Darul Islam is the oldest of all Indonesia's radical movements. It's been active in one form or another for all but a few of the sixty years since Indonesia's independence. DI's history can be divided into three distinct periods:

1. from 1948 to 1962, DI waged armed rebellion against the Republican Government
2. from 1962 to the early 1970s, the movement was largely inactive
3. from the early 1970s to the present, it has functioned as an underground movement.

Darul Islam began its armed rebellion in western Java in late 1948, led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo, a charismatic Javanese Muslim politician with a long history of uncompromising Islamism. Kartosoewirjo rejected both the religiously neutral basis of the Indonesian Republic and the Republican Government's peace agreements with the returning 'infidel' Dutch colonial forces. On 7 August 1949, he promulgated the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, or NII) based on shari'a law and declared himself to be the *imam* or religious leader as well as the supreme military commander. The rebellion spread to four other provinces: Aceh, South Sulawesi, Central Java and South Kalimantan. Although fighting under the one Darul Islam banner, the various regional movements had significant cultural and ideological differences, and communications between them were sporadic at best. As a result, Kartosoewirjo's control of the broader movement was tenuous, although most sections of DI acknowledged his authority as *imam*. There are no reliable figures on the number of DI combatants, but some estimates suggest that, at its high point in the mid-1950s, the movement had about 13,000 men under arms in West Java and perhaps as many as 30,000–40,000 across Indonesia (van Dijk 1981).

From the earliest days of its struggle, DI's rhetoric was strongly jihadist. DI troops were described as *mujahid* (Holy War fighters) who were waging a '*jihad fi Sabilillah* (Holy War in the path of God) until all Islam's enemies were expelled'. Republican forces were labelled 'apostates', 'communists' and 'heathens', and it was obligatory for 'true Muslims' to eliminate them. One Kartosoewirjo statement called on DI members 'to eliminate all infidels and atheism until annihilated and the God-Granted State exists firmly in Indonesia, or die as martyrs in a Holy War'. In another of his manifestos he declared himself to be 'the sweeper away of benighted communities (*masyarakat Jahiliyah*) and the destroyer of whoever is a traitor and apostate, infidel, and deceiving hypocrite who sell out the Faith and the State' (Dengel 1995: 127, 129).

Surrounded by his supporters and security detail Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, (centre), alleged leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, arrives at court, 25 April 2002. AP via AAP/Tatan Syuflana © 2002 AP

DI ideology was absolutist: it claimed that all Muslims must choose between living in a realm where shari'a was comprehensively enforced (i.e. *darul Islam*) and living in a place hostile to Islam (*darul harbi*) where God's law wasn't implemented and Islam's enemies sought to destroy the faith. Any Muslim who decided not to join *darul Islam* was regarded as apostate and thus surrendered all rights to life and property. This became the rationale for DI's campaign against perceived Muslim 'foes'.

DI's operations spanned a wide range of activities. It was capable of military attacks using forces of more than 600 men; it had special assassination squads targeting Indonesian government officials (one nearly succeeded in killing President Soekarno in 1957); it attacked public places such as village markets, cinemas and government offices; it sabotaged railway and communications systems; and it also had killing squads with monthly quotas. Particularly from the early 1950s, DI's operations were aimed at terrorising government officials and villages that opposed it. Indeed, the term '*teror*' was often used by DI's victims to describe the effect of the attacks upon them.

Despite its trenchant jihadism, the DI's religiosity was notably heterodox. Kartosoewirjo was drawn to Islamic mysticism (Sufism) and encouraged a cult of personality around him in which he was cast as the Mahdi, a divinely guided leader of Muslims, who possessed magical powers. He and many of his followers practised a syncretic form of Islam that blended folk-influenced village Islam with more orthodox expressions of the faith (Horikoshi 1975, Dengel 1995).

Most of the DI rebellion was crushed in the early 1960s by the Indonesian Army. This was usually done by force of arms and through innovative counter-insurgency strategies, such as systematically encircling DI strongholds and offering amnesties to DI field commanders who agreed to surrender. Kartosoewirjo was captured, tried and executed for treason in 1962, and the last of the senior DI leaders in Kalimantan and Sulawesi were killed in 1965. The cost of the rebellion was enormous. An estimated 20,000–40,000 people lost their lives, about one million others were evacuated, over half a million properties were destroyed and the economic disruption in DI-affected areas was extensive (Jackson 1980:3, van Dijk 1981, Dengel 1995).

DI's revival began in the late 1960s and early 1970s as former members in West Java began to reactivate the movement covertly.

The DI movement collapsed after Kartosoewirjo's death. A great many DI fighters were captured and incarcerated, but eventually released on condition that they pledge allegiance to the Republic. Some were recruited into the military and intelligence services or the bureaucracy, and the orphans of DI fighters were often adopted by Indonesian army officers and intelligence operatives. As DI members were usually strongly anticommunist, many of these recruits were used by the Army in the campaign against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) during the mid-1960s. Those DI fighters who escaped capture blended back into society, but maintained informal links to their former DI colleagues.

DI's revival began in the late 1960s and early 1970s as former members in West Java began to reactivate the movement covertly. Old personal networks and command structures became the basis of a re-formed organisation, and new recruits were inducted into DI and given training and indoctrination. DI had some success in instituting an underground state structure parallel to that of the Indonesian Republic. It had its own ministers, military commanders (but little overt military activity), departments, revenue raising and social control mechanisms among DI-sympathising communities. Rarely did this function effectively, and in many areas it was little more than an informal and ramshackle structure, but continuing loyalty to the cause and its leaders was undeniable. DI remained a relatively small, poorly organised, and for the most part innocuous movement until at least the early 1980s (confidential interviews, Jakarta, April 2004).

A key development in this third stage of DI's history was the intervention in and manipulation of DI by sections of the New Order regime's intelligence agency, Bakin. Led by one of Soeharto's most trusted political operators, Major General Ali Moertopo, Bakin appears to have begun cultivating ties with important DI figures from as early as 1971.

Its initial purpose was probably mainly related to security: it needed inside information on possible subversive activities by the movement. In approaching DI members, Bakin agents suggested that they help the government fight resurgent communism in Indonesia. The political usefulness of DI became apparent in the run-up to the 1977 general election, when the regime disclosed that it had uncovered a subversive plot by Muslim radicals in an organisation called 'Jihad Command' (Komando Jihad). Many of the DI 'recruits' were then arrested, tried and jailed on subversion charges. The 'revelations' appeared calculated to discredit the regime's main 'opposition' party, the Islam-based United Development Party (PPP), by raising the spectre of Muslim extremism during the election campaign. At the time, many observers believed that the Komando Jihad members had been found guilty on fabricated evidence, but recent material unearthed by the ICG suggests that at least some of these former DI members may have been actively engaged in anti-state activities (ICG 2002a, 2005; Abduh 2002).

Several characteristics have distinguished DI during the period since the 1970s:

- internal fragmentation
- changing ideological outlook and operational methods
- growing attraction to terrorism on the part of DI members.

The internal fragmentation of DI has multiple causes. To begin with, there was no figure capable of attracting broad support and uniting the movement. In 1974, a meeting of DI leaders appointed the Acehnese Islamic scholar Daud Beureueh as *imam*, a position he held until his death in 1984. Daud's poor health, his remoteness from the DI heartlands of West Java and his preoccupation with local Acehnese concerns rendered him an ineffective leader of DI. Following his death, some of Kartosoewirjo's former commanders, former assistants and sons laid claim to the DI leadership. The most prominent of these were Adah Djaelani, Ajengan Masduki and Kartosoewirjo's sons, Tahmid Rachmat Basuki and Dodo Ahmad Sudarda (Abduh 2002:28–40, ICG 2005:3–5).

Relations with the New Order, and particularly its intelligence agencies, were another divisive issue. While many in DI eschewed such contact, some leaders and factions proved amenable to government overtures and largesse. Cars, houses, credit and businesses have all been provided to biddable DI leaders by the intelligence community.

The most controversial debate within the present-day DI concerns the Ninth Regional Command (known by the acronym KW9) in West Java under the leadership of Panji Gumilang (alias Abu Toto). Gumilang is a protégé of Adah Djaelani and has enjoyed close relations with sections of the former Soeharto regime, the Habibie Government and the recently departed head of the State Intelligence Agency, General AM Hendropriyono (retired). Ma'had al-Zaytun, Gumilang's Islamic boarding school in Indramayu, is the best equipped and most lavish of its kind in Indonesia. At least part of the school's considerable income is generated through DI networks, but Gumilang has also attracted generous funding from government (Majlis Ulama Indonesia 2002:21–5). His opponents within DI accuse him of betraying the movement's ideals, and many books damning his activities have been published. Gumilang's own agenda remains open to dispute. He claims to be loyal to the Indonesian state and its religiously neutral Pancasila ideology, but his detractors contend that he retains a concealed aspiration to lead Darul Islam and establish an Islamic state (al-Chaidar 2000, Wahab Abdi 2002).

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, DI's internal factionalism was complex, fluid and at times violent. Constantly changing alliances accompanied the rise and fall of new factions, and several rivals to particular leaders were killed. In 2001, the prominent and often unreliable DI writer, al-Chaidar, claimed that the organisation had fourteen factions. Although this figure is now widely quoted, al-Chaidar has provided little evidence to support his claim; police, who investigated his allegations of bombings by several of the more militant DI groupings, found his account not credible. Regardless of the details of DI's divisions, it's clear that the movement has limited internal coherence. The ideal of founding an Islamic state in Indonesia based on shari'a remains a common goal for all DI members, and the memory and struggle of Kartosoewirjo are widely revered, but there are deep differences over doctrine, politics and personalities within the movement.

The second point for analysis is DI's changing ideological and organisational outlook. The changes began from the mid-1970s, especially as a result of new concepts entering Indonesia from the Middle East. The details of how this occurred remain murky, but it is likely that former DI figures returning from Egypt brought back with them Muslim Brotherhood ideas and popularised them in Darul Islam circles. One Brotherhood organisational concept adopted by DI was the use of small cells, known as *usrah*. Such cells were difficult for the security services to monitor or penetrate and they also enabled the creation of a more pietistic and close-knit body of cadres (Abduh 2002; confidential interviews with former DI activists). The *usrah* model and other Brotherhood ideas may also have come via the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII; Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council), which did much to popularise new Middle Eastern thinking in Indonesia during the 1970s and 1980s (Jones 2003:106–7).

The third new tendency in DI since the 1970s is its growing proclivity to extreme jihadism. As is apparent from its operations in the 1950s, DI had no aversion to using violence in seeking to achieve its goals. But following the organisation's revival, violent attacks were rare—no doubt because of the effectiveness of New Order controls on subversive activity. This began to change in the mid-1980s, as growing numbers of DI cadres were attracted to more militant operations. Probably about half of the 500 or more Indonesians who served as *mujahidin* in Afghanistan from about 1985 until the early 1990s came from DI circles (other sources of recruits included the Islamic Youth Movement (GPI) and local mosque and Qur'anic study groups). Later, various factions of the organisation sent members to JI training camps in Mindanao and Central Sulawesi. Small numbers of DI fighters were also involved in the Muslim–Christian conflict in Ambon and Poso, in the provinces of Maluku and Central Sulawesi respectively, between 2000 and 2003.

Finally, there's prima facie evidence that the perpetrators of the Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta on 9 September 2004 were drawn at least in part from a DI-linked group in Banten, west of Jakarta, led by Kang Jaja (ICG 2005). It's also noteworthy that most of JI's suicide bombers appear to be drawn from groups with a DI background. This pattern of jihadist behaviour prompted Sidney Jones to write: 'If there is any replacement to JI in Indonesia, the chances are that it will have DI roots.' (ICG 2003:25)

... DI's active membership may be as many as several tens of thousands, spread across four or five main factions and myriad smaller groupings.

Present-day Darul Islam

Aside from a 2005 ICG report, little in-depth research has been done on the current state of Darul Islam, and reliable information about the number of members and factions and the nature of their current activities is scarce. Using data from several sources, it's possible to conclude that DI's active membership may be as many as several tens of thousands, spread across four or five main factions and myriad smaller groupings.

The main factions are those led by Panji Gumilang, Tahmid, Ajengan Masduki, Gaos Taufik and Kang Jaja. Gumilang's KW9 is the largest of these and is variously estimated to have between 20,000 and 30,000 members. It's also the best funded. Tahmid's faction is based in Tasikmalaya, a traditional DI stronghold in West Java. It has several thousand members and is one of the more militant wings of the movement. Tahmid has high standing within the broader DI community, not only because he is Kartosoewirjo's son but also because of his self-proclaimed mission of preserving the purity of his father's struggle for an Islamic state. Ajengan Masduki's faction is also based in West Java, while Gaos Taufik's is led from Medan in North Sumatra; it's difficult to assess the size of either group, but some reports indicate up to a thousand members. Kang Jaja's 'Banten Ring' faction, in addition to its Bantenese membership, also has active cells in various districts of West Java and possibly Central Sulawesi. Jaja was close to Ajengan Masduki, although recent reports suggest that his group now operates independently. Its membership appears to be at least several hundred strong. Other smaller groups include the Jakarta-based Ali Murtado group, which is also aligned to Tahmid, and the so-called AMIN group (Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara; The Islamic Holy War Force of the [Indonesian] Archipelago), which is based on the outskirts of Jakarta (confidential sources in Jakarta and West Java; ICG 2005).

While several of these DI factions have regularly engaged in armed violence, most DI members appear to avoid such activities, even though the need for physical struggle is emphasised in the movement's training and doctrine. Many DI groups, however, have some involvement in criminal activity and regard it as a legitimate way of raising funds. Probably the most dangerous DI factions are those associated with Ajengan Masduki, Jaja and Tahmid. These factions include tens, if not hundreds, of cadres who have undergone military training, some of them in Afghanistan and the Philippines, and who also have access to arms and explosives. Jaja's Banten Ring has been a source of recruits for several large JI-led operations, including the Christmas Eve attacks on churches in 2000 and the Bali bombings in 2002, and seems also to have provided some of the perpetrators of the Australian Embassy attack, including the suicide bomber, Heri Golun. The AMIN group has been implicated in several armed robberies, a bomb attack on the Istiqlal mosque and a vicious attack on Muslim politician and former Defence Minister, Matori Abdul Jalil (ICG 2005).

Bali Bombing suspect Amrozi bin Nurhasyim testifies at Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's trial in Jakarta, June 19 2003. AP via AAP/Dita Alangkara © 2003 AP

Jemaah Islamiyah

Jemaah Islamiyah is the largest and most sophisticated terrorist network in Southeast Asia and also the region's only genuinely transnational jihadist movement. While Indonesia is the main operational base of JI and provides the bulk of its leadership and membership, the organisation also has active cells in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. There have been claims that JI has operational cells in southern Thailand, Cambodia and in the Burma–Bangladesh border region as well as in Australia, but these are difficult to verify independently.

Jemaah Islamiyah is the largest and most sophisticated terrorist network in Southeast Asia and also the region's only genuinely transnational jihadist movement.

JI was formally established in Malaysia on 1 January 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar, several months after he and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir left Darul Islam ('Mu'nim Mulia' 2003:1). Sungkar and Ba'asyir used the term '*jemaah Islamiyah*' within DI during the 1980s to refer to the community of exemplary Muslims that they were seeking to build through the use of *usrah* groups (Jones 2003). The aim was to create a genuinely 'Islamic space' within which young Muslims could behave strictly according to the teachings of the pious ancestors (*as-salaf as-salih*). In this sense, Sungkar and Ba'asyir saw themselves as *salafis*. The reasons for the shift from an informal *jemaah* (community or congregation) to a formal, structured organisation have been little studied, but several explanations are plausible.

First, the move to create a more disciplined and militarily capable organisation was in keeping with Sungkar and Ba'asyir's strategy from the mid-1980s that Muslims be more emphatic in waging *jihad* against their enemies. They believed that only through the tactical use of violence could Muslims hope to strike back against the 'Islamophobic' Indonesian state and its Jewish and Christian supporters, both domestically and abroad. This required a well-coordinated, covert organisation able to plan major long-term operations and carry them out with precision and lethal effect. Second, the more jihadist thinking emerging from the Middle East and Central Asia probably inclined Sungkar and Ba'asyir to believe that terrorist actions such as bombings and assassinations carried strong religious sanction and represented an obligation for Muslims. These ideas emanated from groups such as Gama'a Islamiyah and Jama'at al-Jihad (often called Islamic Jihad).

The structure of JI evolved over time, but its essential features were set out in the 1996 General Struggle Guidelines of Jemaah Islamiyah (commonly known by the acronym 'PUPJI'). At the pinnacle of the organisation is the *amir* (commander or leader), a position held by Sungkar from 1993 till his death in 1999, and then by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir until his arrest in late 2002. Since then, the *amir*-ship has been held, probably in an acting capacity, by Abu Rusdan (Thoriquddin) until his capture by police in April 2003, and most recently, Abu Dudjana. All JI members are required to swear a pledge of loyalty (*baiat*) to the *amir*, who has wide powers within the organisation.

Immediately beneath the amir are four councils (*qiyadah*): the Governing Council (*majelis qiyadah*), the Religious Advisory Council (*majelis syuro*), the Religious Law Council (*majelis fatwa*) and the Religious Disciplinary Council (*majelis hisbah*). The most important of these is the Governing Council, which oversees a Central Command (*qiyadah markaziyah*), which in turn controls the four regional commands (*mantiqi*) and their subdivisions (*wakalah*). Within each *wakalah* are branches (*qirdas*) composed of cells (*fiah*). A military wing forms a parallel structure within JI; there are also special operations units (*laskar khos*) (PUPJI 1996: chapter 3; ICG 2002b, 2003).

JI has a strong organisational culture and was, at least until late 2002, well administered. There's an effective command structure and close attention to bureaucratic processes, which ensures reliable communication of instructions from the leadership down to the grassroots. Training documents show great emphasis on organisational discipline and adherence to the administrative rules. The crackdown by the Indonesian security services after the Bali bombings disrupted JI's internal communication system but didn't destroy it. The Governing Council continued to meet twice a year, at least until early 2004, and there are regular two-monthly meetings of *wakalah* leaders.

JI's members see it primarily as a religious movement, not a terrorist network.

Funding comes from a variety of sources. There's a 5% minimum 'tax' on members, and JI also raises money from criminal activity, including through the practice of *fai* or robbing non-Muslims for the purposes of *jihad*. A share of the profits from businesses controlled by JI members and sympathisers is also channelled to the organisation (confidential sources; Jones 2003:108–9).

JI's members see it primarily as a religious movement, not a terrorist network. Training documents and anecdotal information from within JI circles indicate that demonstrated commitment to Islam is the overriding quality required in its members. Recruitment is generally restricted to those who are pious in their devotions and keen to learn more about the faith, especially the militant jihadist variant popular in JI. Islamist indoctrination in JI camps is intense, and those who lack commitment are ostracised; members are urged to preach at every opportunity. Persuading the Islamic community about the need to implement comprehensively Islamic law is regarded as an inescapable obligation (ICG 2004a:17–18).

JI's religious orientation is also apparent from its selection of sites for jihadist activity. It devoted few resources to Maluku, the site of bloody Muslim–Christian conflict between 1999 and 2002, because it believed that Muslims in that region, and particularly Ambonese Muslims, were too heterodox and thus unlikely to be receptive to JI's message of *shari'a*-isation. By contrast, JI and its allies have been active in Central Sulawesi for at least three years. Muslims in this province are seen as far more serious in their Islamic observances and as more inclined to undertake *jihad*.

It's difficult to estimate the size of JI's formal membership and, even if a figure were available, it wouldn't necessarily be a true indicator of the organisation's support or breadth as a network. Some scholars have suggested that JI may currently have several hundred members, but other sources claim that there's no reliable data on which any estimate can be based. What's clear is that JI typically uses sympathisers and contacts outside the organisation to assist it in conducting operations. The web of JI leaders' personal relationships may reveal more than a list of sworn members of the organisation. The personal ties between veterans of the *mujahidin* war in Afghanistan are particularly important. JI leaders such as Hambali and Muchlas have repeatedly looked to their fellow Afghanistan alumni, whether inside or outside JI, when putting together terrorist attacks.

JI's operational history

JI's history can be divided into three phases:

- a pre-terrorist period from 1993 to early 2000
- an anti-Christian period from mid-2000 to late 2001
- an anti-Western phase from late 2001 to the present.

In its first seven years of activity, JI was remarkable for its patience in building a broad and effective *jihadi* network. Its earliest significant attack was on several churches in the North Sumatran city of Medan in late May 2000. This was followed in August of that year by the car-bombing of the Philippines ambassador's residence in Jakarta. The bombing, which killed one bystander, was undertaken by JI's Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi with Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) assistance, and seems to have been motivated by a desire for revenge against the Philippines Government for its attack on the MILF and JI camps in Mindanao. On Christmas Eve 2000, JI launched its most extensive attack yet on some thirty-eight churches across five provinces. The attacks occurred within several hours of each other and left nineteen dead.

JI's third and most lethal phase began in late 2001, when it began preparations for attacks on Western diplomatic missions (including those of the United States, Australia and Britain) and public facilities in Singapore. Although never carried out, the planned Singapore attack

was evidence of JI's shift in focus to Western targets and mass-casualty bombings of public places. The most devastating attack during this phase was the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002. Bombs at two busy nightclubs killed 202 people and left another 350 seriously injured. This attack demonstrated a major increase in JI's terrorist capacity. Not only was the size and sophistication of the main bomb far greater than anything previously attempted, it was also detonated by a suicide bomber—the first time JI had used this method. Most of the victims were Western tourists, though thirty-eight Indonesians also died in the attack. Subsequent comments by the perpetrators made clear that they were seeking to inflict high casualties on Westerners.

Further suicide car-bombings followed, this time in Jakarta, with attacks on the JM Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003, which killed ten Indonesians and one Dutchman, and the Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004, which killed eleven Indonesians. On present evidence, primary responsibility for the embassy blast rests with the Malaysian operatives Dr Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohamad Top, who recruited the bombing team from within JI and DI circles. Some sources suggest that Azhari and Noordin are estranged from the JI leadership and conducted this operation without the approval of the central command (ICG 2005; confidential sources).

JI has worked closely with sections of other jihadist groups in Indonesia and the region in mounting attacks, terrorist and otherwise.

JI has worked closely with sections of other jihadist groups in Indonesia and the region in mounting attacks, terrorist and otherwise. These include sections of Wahdah Islamiyah and Laskar Jundullah, both of which are based in South Sulawesi, the Mujahidin Kompak, an informal paramilitary wing of the Jakarta-based aid organisation Kompak, and the Yayasan Bulan Sabit Merah (Red Crescent Foundation), a West Java-based group linked to Kang Jaja and Tahmid. Sections of JI, if not the central leadership, have provided training and technical expertise to these organisations and collaborated with them in planning and carrying out operations. The best documented of these have taken place in Central Sulawesi and have involved attacks on Christian churches and clergy (ICG 2004a).

JI also has some links to the Free Aceh Movement (GAM; Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), mainly through former leaders of the DI movement in Aceh and their families. One of the best documented points of contact between GAM and JI has been Abu Hasbi Geudong, whom Daud Beureueh appointed as his successor to lead DI in 1987. Abu Hasbi had become well acquainted with some of the Java-based DI leaders in the 1970s. Following three years in jail for subversion (1979–1982), he renewed his ties with DI and future JI leaders, eventually fleeing to Malaysia in the mid-1980s and living with Sungkar and Ba'asyir. His son, Fauzi Hasbi, continued the relationship and after JI's formation liaised between GAM and JI, providing information and materiel. Many aspects of the GAM–JI relationship remain murky, though there's little evidence of any significant operational cooperation between them. Indeed, there's an ideological gulf between the two organisations: in contrast to JI's strict *salafi* jihadism, GAM is driven primarily by ethnic and regional sentiment rather than religious identity. (ICG 2002b:7)

Outside Indonesia, JI has cooperated closely with the MILF and has had some contact with the Abu Sayyaf group, which is also based in the southern Philippines. There are reports that it has relations with the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), but these are difficult to confirm independently. Ba'asyir and JI were also pivotal in attempts to establish a Southeast Asia-wide jihadist network known as the Rabitatul Mujahidin. Included in this group were representatives of the MILF, Abu Sayyaf, the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, the KMM and Laskar Jundullah. The organisation reportedly met only three times, but this initiative showed JI's concern for establishing a broader web of contacts (Funston 2002, Singapore White Paper 2002, Abuza 2003:171–77, Neighbour 2004:221–30).

Doctrine and ideology

Various labels have been used to describe JI's ideological orientation, with *salafi*, *Wahabi*, *salafi-Wahabi* and *jihadi* being the most common. None of these individual terms is satisfactory and some are misleading. JI, while sharing some features with Wahabiism, also differs significantly from it, particularly about jurisprudential interpretations of *jihad* and the permissibility of rebellion against a ruler. JI leaders view Wahabiism as too closely identified with the Saudi regime, a government they regard as having betrayed Islam to Western infidel interests. Few Wahabists would regard JI members as kindred spirits, and JI does not describe itself as Wahabist.

JI's preferred self-description is *salafi*. In the PUPJI, it's stipulated that JI is a salafist organisation and that only *salafi* Muslims can become members (PUPJI 1996: 14, 18). The writings of senior JI leaders also make repeated reference to their *salafi* orientation (Imam Samudra 2004). However, as noted above, most Indonesian salafist groups don't see JI as properly *salafi*, and the organisation is more accurately cast as a jihadist subcategory within salafism.

Salafis and *salafi jihadis* differ sharply on at least five major issues:

- the permissibility of *jihad*
- the scope of *jihad*
- suicide bombing
- the legitimacy of rebellion against a 'Muslim government'
- the validity of clandestine organisation.

The permissibility of jihad

For many mainstream *salafis*, *jihad* is only allowed with the express approval of the ruler, provided that ruler is legitimate according to Islamic law. In the Indonesian case, the central government is regarded as a 'Muslim government' and no *jihad* can be waged unless that government gives permission or the government itself prevents the implementation of the shari'a. The minimal definition of a 'Muslim government' in this context is that it contains a majority of Muslims and doesn't obstruct the carrying out of Islamic law. Such a government doesn't necessarily have to implement the shari'a and it may even act tyrannically towards Muslims.

Salafi jihadis believe that the only legitimate form of Muslim rule is a caliphate and that, as such a system no longer exists, Islamic groups must follow the directions of their commander or *amir* in deciding whether to wage *jihad*.

The scope of jihad

Salafi thinkers hold to the traditional limits placed on the conduct of *jihad*. Noncombatants, particularly women, children and the elderly, shouldn't be targets in any conflict, and the use of terror tactics such as bombings, assassinations and hijackings is outside the bounds of honourable war. Indeed, *salafis* condemn terrorists as *muharibin* (those who do earthly damage) and advocate the death penalty for them.

JI members believe that, given the military superiority of Islam's enemies, *jihad* must be 'total' war, including terrorist attacks. Abdullah Azzam, for example, claims that jihadists should: 'Declare to the infidels and Crusaders that we are terrorists, because this kind of terror is an obligation which is set out in the Qur'an. The East and West must understand that we are terrorists and extreme'(quoted in Solahudin 2004:13). JI members cite the principle of reciprocity, saying that because Islam's enemies have killed innocent women and children, so too should Muslims adopt such strategies. Perhaps the most graphic statement of this view was the so-called 'Istimata Declaration' which appears to have been prepared largely by Imam Samudra, though with the approval of the central JI leadership. The statement appeared in English and Indonesian on a website shortly after the Bali bombing.

> Let it be acknowledged that every single drop of Muslim blood, be it from any nationality and from any place will be remembered and accounted for. Thousands of Muslims have perished, notably in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Gudjarat and in various places on the Asian continent. Elsewhere in Europe, Muslims were mercilessly persecuted in Bosnia and Kosovo. While in Africa, Muslims were brutally killed in the Sudan. The heinous crime and international conspiracy of the Christians also extends to the Philippines and Indonesia. This has resulted in 'Muslim cleansing' in Moro [southern Philippines], Poso, Ambon and surrounding areas [in Indonesia]. It is clearly evident the Crusade is continuing and will not stop…
>
> One Muslim to another is like a single body. If one part is in pain, the other part will also feel it.
>
> To all you Christian unbelievers (*kafir*)! If you define this act on your civilians [i.e. the Bali bombing] as heinous and cruel, you yourself have committed crimes which are more heinous. What about the 600 thousand babies in Iraq and half a million children in Afghanistan including their mothers who are treated as combatants? They are assumed to be at fault and consequently should bear the brunt of thousands of your bombs???!!!!
>
> Where is your rationality and your conscience???!!!
>
> The cries of the babies and Muslimah [Muslim women] as well as the diplomatic efforts of a small number of Muslims has never succeeded in stopping your brutality and it will never succeed.
>
> Well, here we are the Muslimin [Muslim men]!!!
>
> Well, here we are, as bold relatives of those who have died as a result of your aggression.
>
> Our hearts are in pain and we will harness the pain of the death of our brothers and sisters. We will never let your cruelty on our brothers go unpunished. You will bear the consequences of your actions wherever you are.
>
> We are responsible for the incident in Legian, Kuta, Bali [i.e. the Bali bombing].
>
> *Kuta, 12–10–02 (Istimata Declaration 2002, http://www.istimata.com, accessed on 7 December 2002)*

Suicide bombing has, however, become an integral part of JI's major terrorist attacks.

Suicide bombing

Salafis see suicide bombers as having committed a sinful act because their *jihad* is contrary to the laws of Islam.

Suicide bombing has, however, become an integral part of JI's major terrorist attacks. The organisation regards suicide bombers as martyrs who have died in the 'path of God' (*fi sabilillah*) and who are assured of admission to heaven.

The legitimacy of rebellion against a 'Muslim government'

Salafis can also be distinguished from *salafi jihadis* by the former's proscription of rebellion against a 'Muslim government'. Whereas JI categorises the Indonesian Government as un-Islamic and seeks to bring it down and replace it with a caliphate, the *salafis* argue that the use of violent *jihad* in such cases is unjustifiable. In general, *salafis* eschew political agitation, whether it be party-based or about broader matters of state structure and governance. Their primary focuses are religious education and preaching.

The validity of clandestine organisation

A final point of contention between *salafis* and *salafi jihadis* is their attitude to the clandestine organisation of activities. As has been pointed out above, JI is a disciplined and hierarchical organisation. Recruits can only be inducted after proving their commitment to JI and its cause, and formal admission requires members to swear an oath of loyalty to the *amir*. Most *salafis* reject involvement in formal organisations as divisive to Islamic unity and as a distraction from religious matters. They object even more strongly to JI's oath-taking, believing that this effectively elevates the *amir* to a position between men and God, and thus runs the risk of becoming polytheism (*syirk*) (ICG 2004c, Solahudin 2004).

An Indonesian Muslim holds a placard during a protest against claims that the bomb blast in Bali and JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta were perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terror network, 19 August 2003. AFP via AAP/Choo Youn-Kong © 2003 AFP

Salafis and *salafi jihadis* also have different sources of religious authority. Most Indonesian *salafi* regard senior Middle Eastern *salafi ulama* as the highest ranking interpreters of Islamic law. Many of these *ulama* are involved in the Saudi-sponsored Kibarul Ulama (Ulama Council), which acts as a peak body of religious scholars, but a number are also based in Yemen and the smaller Gulf states. Prominent among these are the late sheikhs Abdullah Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz and Muhammad bin Shalih al-Uthsaimin, as well as Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi, Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkholi and Wahid al-Jabiri. By contrast, JI leaders prefer to follow the views of the so-called '*ulama ahluts tsughur*', meaning those 'religious scholars' who have direct experience of *jihad* in protecting Islam. Included in the *ahluts tsughur* are Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, Muhammad Sa'id al-Qathani and Ishamuddin Darbalah. Most *salafi* see these figures as greatly inferior Islamic scholars compared to the well-established and peer-respected *salafi* sheikhs (Imam Samudra 2004:68–71, Solahudin 2004:12).

Formally, JI's aim is to establish a caliphate first in the region and then globally. This is referred to repeatedly in the PUPJI (PUPJI 1996: 3, 13–14). It's apparent from the writings and interrogations of key JI leaders that their primary concern is to found an Islamic state in Indonesia as a first step in their struggle. In effect, JI blends the global jihadist and caliphalist thinking of Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam with the Indonesian-focused Islamic statism of Kartosoewirjo and Darul Islam. Thus, while JI members aspire to build transnational Islamic government, their desire for an Islamised state in Indonesia is far more concrete. Only with a caliphate do they believe that Islamic law can be fully enforced. The caliphal model is part of the example of the pious ancestors, which frames JI's plan of action.

While the caliphate is the endpoint of its struggle, JI sees this as only being achievable through a number of intermediary stages. Most important is the need to build a 'genuinely Islamic' society, starting with small 'pockets' or communities (*jemaah*) of exemplary Muslims who can act as beachheads for the jihadist struggle in the broader society. These pockets also serve as spaces of resistance to the 'secular' Indonesian state. Over time, such small communities can expand, bringing a truly Islamic consciousness to society.

The most obvious element of the DI–JI connection is that of family and personal ties.

Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah

Exploring the relationship between DI and JI may seem a merely academic exercise, which might be of historical or ideological interest but shed no light on JI in 2005. In fact, the DI–JI connection reveals much about the nature of modern-day Indonesian radicalism and helps to answer questions about the degree to which JI is a product of local or external forces, the provenance of its doctrines, the sources of its recruits, and the likely trends in future regional terrorism. It is, as Sidney Jones has observed, 'the Darul Islam link which shows how fundamentally Indonesian JI is' (Jones 2003). The DI–JI relationship is complex, partly because neither organisation is monolithic and because the quality of the links between them has varied greatly across time and place. For example, some DI factions have closer relationships with militant elements in JI than they do with rival groups in their own organisation.

The most obvious element of the DI–JI connection is that of family and personal ties. Many JI leaders and operatives are the children or children-in-law of senior DI figures. Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, Abdul Jabar, Abu Rusdan and Jabar all had fathers who were active in DI of the 1950s and 1960s. Jabar, who was convicted in 2003 for fire-bombing a Jakarta church, is the son of one of the DI members involved in the 1957 plot to assassinate President Soekarno. Abdul Wahab Kadungga, who helped to popularise various Middle Eastern jihadist teachings in JI, was married to the daughter of the South Sulawesi DI leader, Qahhar Mudzakkar, and was active in DI before joining Sungkar and Ba'asyir's circle in the mid-1980s. Farihin, who is currently serving a jail sentence for smuggling ammunition, is the son-in-law of a DI leader in Cirebon, West Java. There's also a large group of JI leaders who have either been DI members or protégés of prominent DI religious figures. Sunkgar and Ba'asyir were both inducted into DI in 1976 and held senior positions in the Central Java command until their departure in 1992. Other JI leaders such as Imam Samudra and Jabir, who was a key figure in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, were acolytes of DI *ulama* and were powerfully influenced by their exposure to jihadist doctrines (Abduh 2002, ICG 2005).

As noted above, DI remains the single largest source of JI recruits. Most of the Indonesian *mujahidin* who went to Afghanistan between 1985 and the early 1990s were recruited by Sungkar from DI networks—only later did most choose to join JI. After JI's formation in 1993, both organisations cooperated closely in training and indoctrination. DI members participated in JI's Camp Hudaibiyah in Mindanao from the mid-1990s and later joined JI camps in Central Sulawesi. It continues to be common practice for JI instructors to give military and covert-operations training to DI groups, particularly in Java. Several DI factions also collaborated with sections of JI in mounting attacks on non-Muslim places of worship and priests. One example is the Bulan Sabit Merah Foundation, which was involved with elements of JI in anti-Christian operations in Central Sulawesi (Jones 2003, ICG 2004a).

Ideologically, DI is one of two primary sources for JI—the other being Middle Eastern jihadists such as bin Laden and Azzam. Much as JI sees itself as part of a broader global jihadist movement, it also regards itself as the heir to Darul Islam (Bubalo and Fealy 2005:79–89).

DI's armed struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia and its members' sacrifice in the name of *jihad* during the 1950s and 1960s make it an inspiration for JI members today. Kartosoewirjo is regarded as one of the greatest figures in the history of Indonesian Islam. Sungkar, for example, dated the founding of the Indonesian state from 7 August 1949, the day Kartosoewirjo proclaimed NII, rather than 17 August 1945, the day Soekarno and Hatta announced independence (Sungkar 1997). JI's dichotomous view of the world and its belief in the use of arms against a government that doesn't fully implement Islamic law draw heavily on DI thinking.

DI has been the main representative of violent Islamic radicalism in Indonesia for more than 50 years, and is likely to continue to be so for the foreseeable future. DI ideals have continued to attract Muslims who, whether through ideological orientation or politico-economic alienation, regard the creation of an Islamic state as essential to restoring piety and security to the Islamic community. Despite its fragmentation and internal strife, DI is likely to continue to produce fanatical recruits for JI or other terrorist organisations for many years to come.

Current dynamics within JI

Jemaah Islamiyah was hit hard by the crackdown of the Indonesian police and intelligence services after the Bali bombings. Up to half of the organisation's leaders have been arrested or are fugitives. JI has nonetheless shown considerable resilience and capacity to adapt to this new, and much less congenial, environment. It has developed new means of internal communication, including much greater use of couriers and the constant changing of telephone numbers and email addresses, and it continues to recruit members and to demonstrate an ability to mount major attacks, such as the bombing of the Australian Embassy in September 2004. JI revenue, though diminished, continues to flow from members' 'subscriptions' and from JI-linked businesses.

One of the more interesting developments within JI over the past two years has been a deepening rift between those who favour continued large-scale terrorist attacks and those who want more emphasis on proselytisation, education and recruitment. The 'hardline' group is concentrated around Mantiqi I (Singapore and Malaysia) and Mantiqi III (eastern Indonesia and the Philippines). In the past, its key figures included Hambali, Mukhlas and Imam Samudra, all of whom are now in detention, but other militants such as Zulkarnaen, Azhari Husin and Dul Matin are still at large. The more 'moderate' group—though it's by no means opposed to the use of violence—contains many leaders of the Mantiqi II group (Java and Sumatra), including Ustadz Muhaimin Yahya (alias Ustadz Ziad), Ustadz Abdullah Anshori (alias Abu Fatih), Ahmad Roihan (alias Saad) and Ustadz Abdul Manan. The moderates believe that the mass-casualty terrorism of the hardliners has been counterproductive for JI, bringing the wrath of the Indonesian state upon the organisation and its members and making it far more difficult to proselytise among the Muslim community.

Analysts of JI debate the seriousness of this dispute. Sidney Jones, based on information from the field, believes that JI has much less internal cohesion now than in 2002 and that the splits within the leadership are having an enervating effect. Zachary Abuza, possibly acting on intelligence briefings from the region, asserts that JI has always accommodated groups with widely varying modus operandi, and that the 'moderates' and 'militants' see their respective approaches as all part of the same struggle. On balance, Jones seems to have the stronger sources and her analysis more likely reflects the current dynamics within JI.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that a divided JI would mean a greatly reduced terrorist threat. More important is the strength and extent of the jihadist network in which JI has been a central player. If JI is fragmenting, this may result in a more diffuse pattern of terrorist activity, rather than one focused on a single organisation. This could also mean that Indonesian terrorism will become more difficult for police and intelligence agencies to monitor.

JI and the threat to Australia

Jemaah Islamiyah continues to be a significant threat to Australian citizens and assets. The threat is greatest for Australians living in or visiting Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, but the organisation also poses a danger, albeit of a lower order, within Australia. JI regards Australians as legitimate targets for several reasons.

First, Australia is seen as part of the West, and therefore an enemy of Islam. This antipathy is heightened by our close alliance with the US. Muchlas, for example, has written explicitly:

> So why did we choose Bali as our Target? Because as is understood, Bali is the area most often visited by foreign tourists, particularly from Western and other countries, which *nota bene* are the countries that ally themselves with America and participate directly in the coalition army led by it in the crusade to destroy the Islamic government of Afghanistan and slaughter Muslims there. These countries include: America, England, India, Australia, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, China, Israel and so forth (Muchlas 2003).

Second, Australia is seen as having orchestrated East Timor's separation from Indonesia as part of its hegemonic designs on Muslim majority nations in the region. Particular reference is made to Australia's role in leading the international military force that secured East Timor following the post-ballot violence of August–October 1999. Bin Laden referred specifically to that intervention as a hostile act, and so have several of the Bali bombers.

Third, Australia's post-Bali bombing collaboration with the Indonesian police in investigating JI attacks and hunting down its members has further raised the ire of JI leaders. Many would be aware of the important role of Australian forensic expertise and signals interception and tracking in the capture and prosecution of key JI figures.

The September 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was proof of JI's continued targeting of Australians ...

The September 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was proof of JI's continued targeting of Australians (even though all the victims were Indonesian citizens and most were Muslim). The organisation has a wide range of possible targets: almost any Australian-owned asset or place where Australians gather, for work or leisure, could be attacked. It's most likely, however, that JI would choose a target either of high symbolic value, such as the Australian Embassy or one of the Australian international schools, or a site offering the prospect of mass fatalities, such as a nightclub or shopping centre. Police investigations in Indonesia have shown that JI-linked operatives such as Azhari, Noodin Top and Zulkarnaen are actively engaged in assembling the teams and bombs for new attacks. Police have found explosive materials and detonator components in several of Azhari's former hideouts, indicating his determination to continue with bomb attacks.

Australia itself has also been a site for JI operational and support cells. The leadership of JI's Mantiqi 4 (covering Papua and Australia) was based here, at least until late 2002 when its head, Abdul Rahim Ayub, fled the country. Mantiqi 4 ran recruiting and training programs, drawing mainly upon local Indonesians, and had begun planning attacks on the Israeli and US embassies using an Anglo-Australian citizen, Jack Roche. Over the past two years, JI activities within Australia appear to have been largely shut down, although pockets of sympathy for the organisation's struggle remain among the Southeast Asian Muslim community (Neighbour 2004:90–102).

Indonesian Government responses to terrorist groups

Indonesian Government policies on terrorism have changed markedly since the Bali bombings. Before October 2002, successive post-Soeharto governments either doubted the terrorist threat or were reluctant to act against it for fear of a backlash from the Muslim community. This was especially true of the Megawati Government following the 9/11 attacks and the uncovering of the JI cell in Singapore in December 2001, both of which resulted in a substantial increase in intelligence data on regional terrorist networks. While sections of the Indonesian security services, particularly the State Intelligence Agency, took targeted initiatives, such as secretly capturing the al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq and instigating the arrest of the JI-linked Agus Dwikarna in Manila in early 2002, the government discouraged further actions that might have left it open to charges of being anti-Islamic.

After the Bali bombings, the Megawati Government's responses improved dramatically. The Indonesian Government has prosecuted and convicted more terrorists than any other national government over the past two years. Some forty-five people have now been found guilty of terrorism or related acts, most of them connected to the Bali or Marriott bombings. Three have been sentenced to death, a relatively rare punishment in Indonesia's legal system. As noted above, probably at least half of JI's senior leadership is now either in jail or on the run. Moreover, JI's operations have been greatly disrupted by improved surveillance and interception by state security agencies. The Megawati Government, with the support of parliament, enacted special anti-terrorism legislation that grants extensive powers to the police and prosecutors while avoiding some of the more draconian provisions found in the Malaysian or Singaporean Internal Security Acts or in some European counter-terrorism laws. While enabling effective and expeditious pursuit of terrorists, these laws haven't significantly impinged on human rights. For all these reasons, the Indonesian Government has won deserved praise at home and abroad for its management of the terrorism issue.

Other, more politically sensitive aspects of the fight against terrorism have been less adequately dealt with. Foremost was the failure of the Megawati administration and more recently the Yudhoyono Government to explain the nature of the terrorism threat to the public, particularly as it relates to JI and other terrorist groups. Megawati stated after the Bali bombings that it was the responsibility of Muslim organisations, not the government, to campaign against Islamic radicalism. Consequently, neither she nor her ministers were prepared to lead public debate against militant expressions of the faith; nor did they seek to convince a sceptical Muslim community of the existence and operations of JI. Much of the responsibility for raising public awareness of JI inevitably fell to senior police officials, such as I Made Pastika, Gories Mere and the national police chief, General Da'i Bachtiar. Their efforts have had only minimal impact.

As a result, most Indonesians are ambivalent about the terrorism threat. They accept that terrorists such as Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Azhari Husin are or have been active in Indonesia (there has been little criticism of the Bali bomber trials or the heavy sentences handed out), but they remain unconvinced that a JI network operates in the country and is responsible for many of the terrorist attacks. The prevalence of 'JI scepticism' was evident in Indonesian press reporting of the recent Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta. While foreign press reports made explicit reference to JI being involved in, if not responsible for, the attack, most of the Indonesian media avoided mention of the organisation and concentrated instead on individual suspects. The lack of public understanding of JI as an organisation and a violent subculture within Indonesian Islam militate against broader government counter-terrorism actions, such as taking measures against schools that teach virulent jihadism.

The government has pointed to difficulties in proscribing an organisation with a name as common as Jemaah Islamiyah.

Another shortcoming of Indonesian responses to terrorism has been the government's tardiness in proscribing JI. In late 2002, the Megawati Government supported a motion in the United Nations to place JI on the register of terrorist organisations. Since that time, little has been done formally to bring the ban into effect. The government has pointed to difficulties in proscribing an organisation with a name as common as Jemaah Islamiyah. While there's some justification for this view, the problems faced aren't insurmountable. The government's unwillingness to tackle them indicates the political sensitivity of the issue.

There are grounds for doubting the will and capacity of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his government to take bold counter-terrorism measures. While the new president has made encouraging statements about his determination to fight terrorism, his record suggests that he is wary of provoking an Islamic backlash. For example, he avoids describing JI as an Indonesian organisation, and asserts that his government can take no action against JI until more evidence is available about its activities within Indonesia's borders. He told *Time* magazine:

> I will review the steps being taken to deal with terrorism by the judicial, intelligence and police bodies to determine what actions need to be taken to eliminate terrorism, including the position of Jemaah Islamiyah and places suspected of having ties to terrorism. After the review, if there's proof that Jemaah Islamiyah as an organization does exist in Indonesia and that its members are involved in terrorist activities, then it will be declared a banned organization. We will use the legal process ... not a political one.
>
> —*Time Asia Magazine*, 8 November 2004

Yudhoyono's most revealing comment on JI came during an interview with an Australia-based television journalist in November 2004. In reply to a question on whether he would ban JI, Yudhoyono answered: 'If I got strong legal evidence that Jemaah Islamiyah does exist in Indonesia, I will of course ban that organisation.' The journalist then commented that the trial of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir showed how difficult it was to prove JI's existence. At this point, Yudhoyono conferred *sotto voce* in Indonesian with his foreign affairs adviser, Dino Pati Djalal, seemingly unaware that the camera was recording his conversation. The following exchange occurred:

> Yudhoyono: But the recent trial couldn't prove that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir wasn't part of Jemaah Islamiyah. And she pressed me on this point. Is this sensitive?
>
> Presidential adviser: Maybe. It might be better if you didn't admit that Jemaah Islamiyah exists.
>
> Yudhoyono: But domestically it's really sensitive?
>
> Presidential adviser: Yes, you'd better just give her the background.
>
> —'Love thy neighbour', *Sunday* program, Nine Network Australia, 14 November 2004

These comments show Yudhoyono's preoccupation with the politics of moving against JI. Were the president to admit that JI exists in Indonesia, he would then be required to take emphatic action against it. It's telling that he asks not about the strength of the legal case against JI, but rather about the domestic 'sensitivity' of the issue.

Other radical groups

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

In some ways, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) almost warrants inclusion with Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah. It has strong ideological ties to and some overlapping membership with both organisations. Since its founding on 7 August 2000, the fifty-first anniversary of DI's declaration of an Indonesian Islamic state, MMI has portrayed itself as an umbrella organisation for all pro-shari'a groups. More specifically, it sees itself as a legatee of Darul Islam and has self-consciously sought to bridge the differences between the many rival DI factions and bring them together. It has had some success, and most DI groupings have joined MMI, although relatively few influential DI leaders figure prominently in MMI's internal discourses.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir became the organisation's *amir*, despite sharp debate within JI on the wisdom of forming MMI (ICG 2004a:3). MMI's central objective is the 'complete' (*kaffah*) implementation of shari'a in Indonesia. It seeks to achieve this through public advocacy and involves itself in a range of activities such as seminars, rallies, publishing and public education campaigns in order to strengthen support for shari'a. Like JI, it's also committed to the creation of a *daulah Islamiyah* and caliphate, both nationally and internationally. Although these aspects of MMI appear legal and legitimate, some of its activities are less savoury. MMI has a militia, Laskar Mujahidin, which, in addition to providing security for the organisation and its leaders, also sent members to fight in Maluku.

Front Pembela Islam

Front Pembela Islam (FPI) is the best known of Indonesia's Islamic vigilante groups. Its main activity, until recently, was campaigning against places of vice or iniquity. This included demonstrations as well as violent assaults on red-light establishments, bars, gambling dens and dance clubs. Typically, dozens of FPI members would attack a venue with long sticks, destroying the 'offending' assets (alcoholic drinks, gambling tables, prostitutes' rooms and the like) and sometimes harassing or beating staff and patrons. Its raids often gained extensive press coverage, both in Indonesia and abroad. FPI was founded in West Java on 17 August 1998, Indonesia's Independence Day, by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab and KH Misbahul Anam. They formed the front in response to what they saw as an alarming rise in immorality and irreligious behaviour in their communities. Unlike the members of most other radical groups, most FPI members are traditionalists, many of them Betawi and Bantenese with a Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) background. Anam also has NU roots, but Rizieq, a fiery preacher of Yemeni descent, is a modernist.

FPI describes itself as *ahlus sunnah wal jamaah* (literally, 'Followers of the Prophet Muhammad and [the consensus of] his community'). In much of the Muslim world *ahlus sunnah wal jamaah* is longhand for 'Sunni', but FPI uses the term in a narrower way. It describes its *ahlus sunnah wal jamaah* as being of salafist orientation, and is critical of mainstream Islamic organisations who use the term in its broader sense. In common with

An Indonesian soldier in riot gear walks past burning pews in front of a Catholic Church in Jakarta, 22 November 1998.
AP via AAP/Charles Dharapak © 1998 AP

nearly all other radical groups, FPI advocates wide-ranging implementation of shari'a as well as constitutional recognition of the Jakarta Charter, but unlike DI, JI and MMI, FPI recognises the Pancasila-based Unitary Republic of Indonesia as the final form of the state and asserts that priority should be given to making individuals better Muslims rather than seeking to change the basis of the state. Rizieq opposes creating an Islamic state in Indonesia and argues that, while the Qur'an is explicit in its call for shari'a to be upheld, it neither stipulates nor defines an Islamic state. Therefore, FPI doesn't insist on an across-the-board literal interpretation of Islamic law, claiming that this only diminishes the greatness of the shari'a (PBB IAIN 2000:25–6).

FPI has suffered a number of serious setbacks since late 2002. Habib Rizieq was arrested by police in October 2002 over an FPI attack on a billiard parlour and was later found guilty of inciting hatred and jailed for seven months. The FPI leadership 'froze' the organisation in November 2002, claiming that it had been infiltrated by police spies and other agents bent on destroying it. Although FPI recommenced operations in February 2003, it has been far less active than in the past and, apart from one attack on a nightclub in Jakarta in late October 2004, it hasn't resumed regular vigilante activity (Fealy 2004:114–15).

FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad

At their peak in 2000 and 2001, the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah and its paramilitary arm, Laskar Jihad, were Indonesia's largest and most studied salafist movement. They were active publishers and propagandists, and were relatively accessible to journalists and scholars. FKAWJ was established on 14 February 1998 by Ja'far Umar Thalib, an Afghanistan veteran of Arab–Madurese origin, and a group of about 60 fellow *salafi* leaders. Laskar Jihad was formed on 30 January 2000 in response to what was seen as the persecution of Muslims in Maluku by Christians, and in April of that year sent its first armed units to Maluku. At the height of its Maluku campaign, more than 3000 of its personnel were engaged in fighting, as well as educational and welfare activities. Ja'far, the Laskar Jihad commander (*panglima*), claimed in 2001 that the total membership was about 10,000. There's strong evidence that sections of the military assisted Laskar Jihad, partly because the Maluku conflict generated valuable revenue, and also quite possibly because it was politically useful in keeping pressure on the Abdurrahman Wahid Government not to interfere in military affairs.

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Like FPI, FKAWJ/LJ stressed the necessity of fully implementing Islamic law, but it argued against turning Indonesia into an Islamic state. Moreover, it criticised the concept of NII and MMI for their unswerving commitment to this cause, claiming that the tumult and bloodshed that beset countries such as Algeria when Muslims attempted to impose an Islamic state showed that the harm far outweighed the benefits. As with FPI, it had a similarly narrow interpretation of *ahlu sunnah wal jamaah*. FKAWJ/LJ justified its actions by quoting the opinions of prominent *salafi* scholars in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, such as Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi and Sheikh Mufti al-Hadi Husain. Despite occasional accusations that FKAWJ was part of the al-Qaeda network, virtually all the available evidence runs counter to this. Laskar Jihad certainly conducted military operations, some of them resulting in considerable bloodshed, but it has never been proven to have undertaken terrorist activity. Ja'far, although welcoming the 9/11 attacks, was scornful of Osama bin Laden's religious credentials and disagreed with al-Qaeda's doctrine (Davis 2002, Hasan 2002, van Bruinessen 2002, ICG 2004c).

On 7 October 2002, FKAWJ decided to disband itself and Laskar Jihad. Several factors appear to have led to this. A number of the previously supportive *salafi* scholars in the Middle East reportedly criticised the direction of Laskar Jihad, and there was also mounting criticism of Ja'far's leadership within FKAWJ. Ja'far himself was arrested for incitement in mid-2002 but was eventually found not guilty. Finally, the protection that sections of the army had previously given to Laskar Jihad was withdrawn, leading to far greater difficulties in running field operations and raising funds. Despite occasional reports of continuing Laskar Jihad activity in Papua and Maluku, attempts to verify these have come up empty-handed; there's no strong evidence to indicate continuing Laskar Jihad operations.

Hizbut Tahrir

Hizbut Tahrir is something of an exception among radical groups in Indonesia. It's avowedly political in that it seeks fundamental change to political structures and behaviour, but it rejects involvement in party politics. It eschews the use of force or violence and has no militia units of its own, although it does organise rallies and demonstrations on Islamic issues. More than any other grouping, the caliphal ideal is central to its blueprint for reshaping Muslim society and the state. The group argues that few Muslims currently live as God commanded because they're dominated politically, culturally and economically by non-believers. Only under a caliphate can Muslims be free of subjugation and live as God prescribed.

Hizbut Tahrir was founded in Jerusalem in 1952 by Taqiuddin Al-Nahbani, an Egyptian-trained Palestinian religious scholar and judge. Taqiuddin's ideas showed the influence of Muslim Brotherhood thought, although this is played down in his writings. The group soon built a small but committed following in the Middle East and later spread to Western Europe, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. In several countries, it has been accused of violent activities and banned. It became active in Indonesia in 1982–83 when a local Islamic leader persuaded Abdurrahman al-Bagdadi, an Australian-based Hizbut Tahrir teacher and activist, to move to Indonesia and begin disseminating the party's teachings. Al-Bagdadi soon built a strong following among tertiary students and young intellectuals in Java and Sumatra.

Although Hizbut Tahrir regards itself as a party, it isn't registered as one in Indonesia and it rejects electoral democracy. It believes that only God has the right to make laws and that popular sovereignty can lead to error. In recent years, Hizbut Tahrir has attracted a small but committed following. It runs successful seminars and a publication series and has also maintained a presence on the streets, campaigning on shari'a and morality issues. It's especially strong on a number of campuses in West Java (Fealy 2004:116).

Declining radicalism?

The immediate post-Soeharto years were undoubtedly a time of resurgence for Indonesian radicalism. The number of radical groups grew rapidly, accompanied by a dramatic rise in recruitment, fundraising and public profile. The reasons for this were manifold. To begin with, much of the Soeharto regime's social control apparatus was either dismantled or reined in, making it much easier for radical activists to organise without fear of state repression. Also, many of the restrictions on the press and freedom of association were lifted, allowing Islamic groups to publicise their agendas and mobilise supporters.

Furthermore, in the so-called 'era of reform' (*era reformasi*), the Indonesian public adopted a Voltairean attitude towards radical leaders: though they may not have agreed with the radical perspective, they felt that in the post-authoritarian environment everyone should be able to speak freely, even if their message was provocative. A final factor was elite manipulation of radical groups: some civilian and military leaders at the national and local levels found it expedient to sponsor and facilitate the activities of the groups, not only for financial gain but also for political purposes.

Radical organisations and media outlets have suffered a succession of setbacks that they have either struggled or failed to overcome.

Since late 2002, however, the radical revival has stalled and gone into reverse. Radical organisations and media outlets have suffered a succession of setbacks that they have either struggled or failed to overcome. The process began with the dissolution of the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad in early October 2002. Shortly afterwards, following the 12 October Bali bombings, JI was subjected to a massive investigation and crackdown, which has removed many of its senior leaders and has greatly reduced (but not eliminated) its ability to recruit terrorists and carry out terrorist attacks. In November 2002, FPI suspended activities; although it recommenced operations three months later, its membership and influence are greatly diminished. DI continues to be bitterly divided and unfocused. While MMI and Hizbut Tahrir remain active and legitimate proponents of shari'a and an Indonesian Islamic state, their membership is tiny compared to mainstream Islamic organisations and their role in the public discourse on Islamic issues is peripheral.

There are other signs that radicalism isn't flourishing at present. The hardline newspaper *Jurnal Islam* went bankrupt in 2003. The flagship of radical Islamic journalism, *Sabili*, which in 2002 had the highest circulation of any periodical, has also suffered declining sales in recent years. In addition to this, radical groups had reason to be disappointed with the local response to the US-led Iraq War. Although there was widespread and deep objection to the invasion within the *umat*, the anti-war protests were largely peaceful, and attempts to send Muslim volunteers to help defend Saddam Hussein's regime met with failure. Several radical leaders, including Habib Rizieq, had claimed that the war would prove a boon for mobilising and recruiting Muslims to their cause. This appears not to have been the case for 'legal' groups, such as FPI, MMI and Hizbut Tahrir, but it's possible that the Iraq War helped JI and DI with their recruiting.

Last of all, there's growing evidence that JI and several other local radical groups have sought to re-ignite the Muslim–Christian conflict in Central Sulawesi and Maluku through armed attacks and bombings. To date, local communities have largely resisted being drawn into renewed violence. This is a source of frustration to militant leaders who believe that religious conflict, particularly in the form of perceived anti-Muslim attacks, has a radicalising effect on the *umat* and is helpful to recruitment and fundraising.

Another concern for radical groups has been the shift in community attitudes to them. Many Indonesians are now more inclined to regard militant rhetoric as irresponsible and inflammatory. Mainstream Islamic leaders, especially those of more moderate persuasion, have helped to bring about this change by reasserting what they see as the essentially tolerant and pluralist teachings of their faith.

Islamic radicalism has been part of Indonesian political and religious life since independence and is likely to remain so.

Islamic radicalism has been part of Indonesian political and religious life since independence and is likely to remain so. The more important question is about the extent to which violence is a feature of radical behaviour. In the past, political repression, socioeconomic deprivation and cultural alienation, as well as stimuli from elsewhere in the Muslim world, have all contributed to periodic rises in Islamic violence in Indonesia.

Currently, with the important exception of JI-related terrorist violence, the cycle appears to be on a downward trend. However, a sharp deterioration in the economy, renewed Muslim–Christian conflict or large-scale shedding of Muslim blood elsewhere in the world could reverse this and create favourable conditions for rising radicalism.

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Terrorism in Indonesia: threat and response

Aldo Borgu

The September 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta demonstrated that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is still a force to be reckoned with. However, given that the blast came more than a year after JI's last major operation, it raises questions about the organisation's capabilities, strategic objectives and tactics. Answering these questions becomes important in determining what our policy responses should be. For example, the question of whether or not JI forms part of a global jihad helps determine whether the US global war on terror has any application in Indonesia and our immediate region. If JI is falling victim to a deepening internal rift this could have wide-ranging implications including that we might face an even more diverse and dangerous threat in the years to come. The potential list of questions goes on.

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This chapter seeks to provide a basis upon which to answer those questions. Using the preceding chapter it first attempts to assess the threat of terrorism in Indonesia in its historical, religious, social and political context allowing a better basis upon which to assess the threat on a strategic level. This includes developing an understanding about what exactly we're fighting and how best to fight it, and having a sense of what might constitute 'victory'. Gaining the right context and perspective to judge the threat posed by JI also involves comparing the terrorism of JI with other contemporary like-minded

Photo opposite: Smoke after a car bomb exploded outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, 9 September 2004. EPA/Adhi Widjajanto via AAP © 2004 EPA

jihadist terrorist groups as well as the more traditional varieties of terrorism reminiscent of the 1970s and 1980s. Finally the chapter assesses both the actual terrorist threat and the policy response required to fight that threat.

The threat

JI poses a threat to Australia's national interests on two levels. Based on its members activities to date, the most immediate but less strategically significant threat is the physical one to Australia and Australians. The longer term but more serious strategic threat is that to wider Indonesian stability. And in considering the threat we need to ask how, and how much, JI operations might lay the groundwork for political developments in Indonesia that could prove inimical to Australian interests in the longer term—even if JI itself isn't the direct beneficiary of those operations.

By the same token Islamic militants in Indonesia are highly unlikely to realise their ultimate success—an Islamic Indonesian state—based solely on their own efforts. One recent RAND report stated that the period of most rapid growth of Islamic militant groups was under the Habibie presidency (May 1998 – October 1999) as Habibie sought to mobilise Islamic support in his bid to retain power. In that respect the situation was similar to the encouragement of radical Islam in Pakistan under the presidency of General Zia ul-Haq, though the extent of Zia's policies went far beyond anything that Habibie could intend or expect. Depending on Indonesia's political development this could still become a credible future scenario. A future Indonesian president could, wittingly or otherwise, encourage the development of radical Islam as a political tool and a means of support with possibly dramatic longer-term consequences.

JI's origins are more Indonesian than global jihadist

JI as a group is rooted more firmly in the Indonesian Darul Islam (DI) movement than in organisations such as al-Qaeda. The previous chapter notes that DI is the oldest Indonesian radical Islamist movement and the 'fountainhead' of many of Indonesia's recent radical groups. This suggests that even if JI ceases to exist as a functioning terrorist organisation, any successor organisation will likely have similar roots in DI. The fact remains that DI still has sufficient coherence and availability of fanatical recruits to produce prospective operatives for JI or other jihadist terrorist organisations for many years to come.

Of course, external factors have exerted a stronger influence on Indonesian radicalism in recent times. In fact, underestimation of external influences probably led to an underestimation of Indonesian radicalism in general prior to the Bali bombings.

Al-Qaeda's influence on JI has probably had the effect of broadening JI's campaign to include the US and Australia instead of keeping it focused on sectarian and secessionist issues within Indonesia. After all, JI's anti-Western phase of operations began only after the 9/11 attacks. The influence of al-Qaeda also allowed JI to gain valuable training and experience. But it would be overstating the case to suggest that JI forms a solid part of the global jihadist movement. So far there is no evidence of substantial involvement by Indonesians in conflicts abroad, such as in Iraq. The reason why most Indonesians went to Afghanistan had more to do with gaining military skills to bring about an Islamic state in Indonesia than a desire to participate in a global jihad. By the same token there is no evidence of substantial involvement of foreign jihadists in JI who are not Southeast Asians. So in that sense JI is even less part of a global terror campaign than was the

Baader-Meinhof group and the various Palestinian groups who cooperated on a number of joint terrorist operations in the 1970s.

In some respects this also reflects the reality across a number of countries where al-Qaeda-type groups have emerged. Even before the attacks of 9/11 but more so now, al-Qaeda and like-minded groups can best be summed up as having the motivation and intent to wage a sustained global campaign against the US and its allies, but somewhat lacking in the actual capabilities to do so.

Despite the effort of training thousands of insurgents and terrorists through al-Qaeda training camps at the time, the 9/11 attacks are likely to have caught the many like-minded jihadist terrorist groups, such as JI, unprepared to wage a global jihad against us. In this sense 9/11 can possibly be seen as an attempt to jump-start the revolution. Al-Qaeda and like-minded groups like JI don't seem to have the resources to wage a global campaign, rather they use terrorism and its broad psychological effects as a means to create the wider perception of such a campaign. In all probability we are still witnessing the development of these various groups, that they are still in their training, mobilisation, radicalisation and recruitment phase. It's doubtful whether these groups actually have the network and infrastructure to wage a sustained campaign against us at this stage that would suggest being engaged in a global war.

DI is one of two primary ideological sources for JI—the other being Middle Eastern jihadists. Which is dominant is unknown, but contradictions between the two are likely to be behind some of the factionalism that is suspected and apparently evident within JI today.

It may well be that we now have a better understanding of the role of Indonesian *mujahidin* in Afghanistan and the links between JI and al-Qaeda. But even so, it's more debatable whether we have as accurate a knowledge of the wider political, financial and cultural links between the Middle East and Indonesia, which have yet to manifest themselves in terrorist action. Whereas the Afghanistan veterans may have laid the basis for the current generation of JI operatives, future generations of Indonesian terrorists may instead spring from local pesantren religious schools and be more of a homegrown variety.

While JI has its roots in DI, it isn't an effective insurgency—yet

There's little doubt that al-Qaeda sees its war against the US as an attempt to incite a global insurgency, and its training camps in Afghanistan produced fighters who were more guerrilla than terrorist (see box on p. 50). However, as highlighted above, it's doubtful that al-Qaeda's current campaign represents a global insurgency in fact and capability. It's more like a series of very loosely connected campaigns spread throughout the world, some of which resemble insurgencies while others are more like traditional terrorist operations. For it to be a proper global campaign it would require a far greater degree of centralised planning, direction and coordination than seems evident at present.

But while the campaigns that al-Qaeda and like-minded groups are waging in some countries can be described as a type of insurgency, the same can't be said of JI. Unlike DI, its predecessor, and unlike the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), JI is not currently an effective insurgent movement though it's probably safe to assume that it does have insurgent aspirations. To date, JI hasn't been able to advance its campaign beyond attacking soft targets or to generate any degree of wider support, which places it squarely in the terrorist category. More importantly, its attacks have been aimed at Western or non-Muslim targets within Indonesia, rather than against the Indonesian state itself (see table on p. 51).

While the rhetoric of JI is aimed directly at the Indonesian Government, in contrast to other jihadist terrorist groups in the Middle East and in sharp contrast to the experience of DI, JI's actions so far have not directly challenged the Indonesian Government or state. Such tactics may be a direct result of Indonesian Government actions that have continuously crushed DI whenever it raises it head. Part of the reason for JI not taking responsibility for its terrorist attacks might be related to the wish to avoid direct Indonesian Government responses. The Indonesian Government's reactions after the Bali bombing may yet cause JI to rethink its tactics. But the tendency to attack Christians and foreigners rather than the Indonesian Government might reflect that JI is still in a recruitment and indoctrination phase of its long-term (at least thirty year) struggle to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Presumably only after this stage is complete would it be in a position to challenge Indonesian authorities more directly.

The linkage between insurgency and terrorism

Despite having similar aims and objectives terrorism and insurgency are not the same thing. An insurgency usually involves an armed uprising against the established order and government with the purpose of forcing a change of policy or, ultimately, a change in government. An insurgency could cover the entire national territory and population, or just a portion that seeks to secede or achieve some concession or change in policy.

The means employed in an insurgency usually vary with the approach, strength and support base of the insurgents. Military operations could include:

- terrorist attacks against civilian non-combatants and 'soft' targets to undermine confidence in the government and provoke an overreaction
- guerrilla warfare involving armed attacks against government institutions, agencies and security forces to challenge the government more directly
- more conventional warfare to establish control over territory and even the defeat of government security forces and take power.

Terrorism is the easiest option for a relatively weak insurgency, but might also be employed at any stage of an insurgent campaign. Terrorists generally don't attempt to control territory. Terrorists can develop into insurgents but to do so would require their development into a broader political movement to further their aims. So, terrorism is a tactic of insurgents, but not all insurgents use terrorism. And if defeated early, an insurgency might never progress beyond the use of terrorism.

'Terrorism' is increasingly being used to describe all indiscriminate armed attacks on civilians. However, armed attacks on civilian targets that are undertaken for other than political purposes should be viewed for what they are—criminal activities. In Iraq, a mixture of guerrilla attacks, terrorist attacks and criminal attacks perpetrated by different groups are complicating the security task facing the coalition forces and the Iraqi Government.

MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN INDONESIA ATTRIBUTED TO JI[1]

Date	Target	Location	Killed	Injured
01 Aug 2000	Philippine Ambassador	Jakarta	3	17
24 Dec 2000	Christian churches	Numerous cities[2]	19	94
22 July 2001	Christian churches	Jakarta	0	64
01 Aug 2001	Atrium Mall[3]	Jakarta	0	5
09 Nov 2001	Petra Church[4]	Jakarta	0	0
12 Oct 2002	Paddy's Bar & Sari Club	Bali	202	350
05 Aug 2003	Marriott Hotel	Jakarta	12	150
09 Sep 2004	Australian Embassy	Jakarta	12	182
16 May 2005	BRIMOB unit[5]	Ceram, Moluccas	6	0
28 May 2005	Open air market[5]	Tentena, Sulawesi	22	50

Sources: International Crisis Group (2002, 2003); Patterns of Global Terrorism, *United States Department of State (various years); National Counterterrorism Center Database, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database*

Notes:

1. Data is based on public sources only. Attribution is complicated by the fact that JI rarely claims official responsibility for any attacks. Although it was founded in the early 1990s JI isn't credited with having committed any terrorist attacks until 2000 though it is seen to have developed its militant capabilities in the Malukus and Poso in the late 1990s.
2. Some thirty Christian churches were targeted in Jakarta, Medan, Bandung, only twenty out of thirty-eight bombs actually detonated. The bombs were fairly small and in one case killed three would-be bombers. The attacks are now credited as a major step in JI developing more sophisticated bombing capabilities.
3. The rationale for the Atrium mall is said to be retaliation for attacks on Muslims in Ambon (ICG, 2002). Others sources say that the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) was responsible for the blast.
4. While the International Crisis Group (ICG) attributes the Petra bombing to JI, other sources lay responsibility with Mujahidin Kompak, suspected of being JI-affiliated.
5. The target in Ceram was an Indonesian paramilitary police unit. Two devices were exploded within minutes of each other in Tenetena, maximised for greater casualties. Though attributed to JI by some Indonesian authorities these two attacks are thought to be the work of elements of JI rather than a formal JI operation. In fact the two operations, coupled with the September 2004 bombing might prove to be an indication as to the future directions of Islamic terrorism in Indonesia especially its more diverse nature.

- ICG also attributes a couple of attacks against US fast food outlets in Sulawesi in November 2002 to a JI-affiliated group (Laskar Jundullah) rather than the JI organisation proper.
- The ICG also lists a number of attacks not attributed to JI but makes the point that they should all be re-examined. These include the August 2000 bombing of the Malaysian Embassy, the September 2000 bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange, the second Atrium Mall bombing in September 2001 and the throwing of a hand grenade into the Australian International School in Jakarta on November 2001.
- Some JI operations such as the August 2002 Gold Store robbery in Serang are not included as an attack even though that particular operation is suspected of having raised the funds to mount the Bali bombing.
- Some commentators have ascribed other terrorist attacks in Indonesia to JI but these are under dispute. They include the February 2003 bombing of the Indonesian national police headquarters (no casualties), the April 2003 bombing of the UN building (no injuries) and Jakarta International Airport (eleven injuries), and the July 2003 bombing of the Indonesian Parliament (no casualties). The fact that these bombings simply were not on a scale JI proved itself capable of since Bali lends more credence to the view that they were not the work of the central JI organisation.

At DI's high point in the mid-1950s the movement had about 13,000 men under arms in West Java and perhaps as many as 30,000–40,000 across Indonesia. By the time DI was crushed in the early sixties, some 20,000–40,000 people had lost their lives, a million people had been evacuated and over half a million properties had been destroyed. By comparison, public estimates put the number of JI operatives at about 300–400, with about 5,000 supporters across Indonesia. Deaths attributed to JI attacks to date are unlikely to amount to more than a thousand, although the figure depends on the role that one ascribes to JI in sectarian and secessionist conflict.

So, because the threat from JI is essentially a terrorist campaign, it follows that traditional counter-terrorism may be the most effective way to combat the threat. Counter-terrorism requires a primary use of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, rather than the military. In the Indonesian context, this means it's more important to develop the capabilities of the Indonesian police and intelligence services than to strengthen the Indonesian military (TNI). The Indonesian Government itself recognises this reality with the police having formal responsibility for counter-terrorism while counter-insurgency operations in places such as Aceh have been the responsibility of the military.

JI could yet develop into an effective insurgent phenomenon like its DI predecessor. JI's involvement in areas such as Poso and Ambon may provide the basis for this in the longer term. Iraq is a good example of how a fragmented group of disaffected elements can develop momentum, support and inspiration to become a serious nationwide insurgency. But Iraq also demonstrates that such a progression depends heavily on the state authorities being slow to recognise and act on the threat, and their adoption of strategies that end up feeding the insurgency rather than combating it.

Photos of suspects in the JW Marriott Hotel bombing shown during a press conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, 19 August 2003. AFP via AAP/Bay Ismoyo © 2003 AFP

JI may not be the only terrorist threat we face in the future

Just as our global counter-terrorism efforts are dominated by the need to defeat al-Qaeda, our regional responses are largely focused on JI. On one level, this is perfectly understandable—JI is currently the region's only genuinely transnational jihadist terrorist movement—but the organisation's regeneration and possible future splintering raises the possibility of a diversification of the regional terrorist threat.

It seems obvious to say that al-Qaeda has substantially changed as a terrorist organisation since the US overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 following the 9/11 attacks. Most analysts and commentators today talk of the 'decentralisation' of al-Qaeda and its evolution from a formal terrorist organisation to more of a movement for inspiring other terrorist groups, even an ideology. Under this view the campaign of attacks is now being undertaken by al-Qaeda franchises or affiliates, which are largely territorialised, among which JI is considered part. The question remains, however, as to whether al-Qaeda intends to re-centralise its organisation and capabilities at some point in the future. Osama bin-Laden's al-Qaeda is highly unlikely to have lost its motivation and intent for carrying out its own attacks even if its capabilities have been severely dented. Being just an inspiration for other groups is likely to satisfy al-Qaeda's objectives only in the short term.

It may no longer be useful to think of JI as it existed in 2001 and 2002, particularly to the degree that the Mantiqi regional command structure is still relevant to JI's operations.

Just as the post 9/11 counter-terrorist efforts have largely driven al-Qaeda's evolution and the diversification of the global terrorist threat it is just as likely that regional counter-terrorist efforts following a number of JI plots and operations have directly affected JI's organisation and structure today. Hence it may no longer be useful to think of JI as it existed in 2001 and 2002, particularly to the degree that the Mantiqi regional command structure is still relevant to JI's operations.

The crackdown by Singaporean and Malaysian authorities following the exposure and pre-empting of the JI plot to bomb various foreign embassies in Singapore in December 2001, seems to have largely eliminated the effective JI presence in those countries. As a result JI is less of a regional jihadist group and seems to have decentralised into its Indonesian and Philippine constituent parts. Some recent media reports also indicate that new Islamist groups have emerged in both Malaysia and the Philippines. Furthermore the Indonesian Government efforts after the 2002 Bali bombings may well have resulted in a further decentralisation and diversification of JI within Indonesia itself. To some degree this has been accentuated by the reported rift within JI. But it might also reflect the fact that JI was never as structured and homogenous an organisation as some commentators have made it out to be and more like what one report described as an 'increasingly organised network of individuals'.

Debate over the future of JI is dominated by three issues: whether JI will return to communal conflict within Indonesia to regenerate after the post-Bali crackdown, the reported rift within the organisation, and the degree to which the September 2004 Australian Embassy bombing is a foretaste of things to come. The fact that the bombing outside the embassy seems to have been carried out with the assistance of members of an offshoot of DI rather than JI proper underlines the possibilities of a more diverse threat. In contrast to al-Qaeda's diversification, JI doesn't serve as a movement or inspiration for other like-minded Indonesian groups. It's far more likely that DI retains that role in Indonesia today. Given that our intelligence agencies originally missed the development of JI into a regional terrorist group with the intent and capability to threaten Australian interests there's no guarantee that we could identify other emerging organisations. The July 2005 London bombings point to the possible likelihood of continuous acts of terrorism even if mainstream groups such as al-Qaeda (or JI) are not able to undertake their own centrally directed attacks. Groups of like-minded individuals and amateurs that can independently undertake their own operations are just as deadly as those of professional and organised terrorists.

... internal divisions haven't stopped JI functioning as an effective terrorist organisation in the region ...

JI seems to be splintering into factions but...

Accounts of a rift within JI, which seem to date back some five years, probably have some substance. After all it seems that factionalism within DI is what led to the formation of JI. However internal divisions haven't stopped JI functioning as an effective terrorist organisation in the region during that time. In some respects, the targeting of Australia and Australians may be a direct result of the rift. JI has never been considered a monolithic organisation, and it's debatable to what degree the split is about tactics as opposed to fundamental objectives and doctrine. We need to remember that the so-called 'moderate' group in JI is by no means opposed to the use of violence. If it were, it wouldn't be part of JI in the first place.

Most of the academic debate surrounding the rift has focused on the notion that the 'moderate' or Indonesian faction (as opposed to the global jihadist faction) believe targeting Westerners within Indonesia has damaged JI's recruitment and longer-term political strategies, particularly the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. That view has some merit, it's doubtful that jihadism is sustainable in Indonesia on a purely global basis and appeal without some domestic context. That would also suggest most of the major attacks carried out by JI since 2000 have been done on the initiative of the global jihadists (due to the Western nature of the targets). However that begs the question as to what type of operations the Indonesian elements of JI would prefer. The absence of any terrorist or insurgent action wouldn't appear to be sustainable for an extremist Islamic group, not least because militant action remains one of the more important recruitment tools at their disposal.

It is also possible that such 'moderate' elements within JI are more concerned that attacks resulting in the deaths of ordinary Indonesians directly affects their ability to recruit and sustain their organisation. The concern with killing Westerners may have more to do with the global attention this focuses on their activities and the degree of regional and international counter-terrorist cooperation such attacks bring. A case in point is the scale of Australia–Indonesian police cooperation after the 2002 Bali bombings that has had a noted adverse effect on JI.

Terrorist rifts and factions

Rifts within terrorist groups have been occurring since the origins of such groups. What began as the IRA and PLO in the 1960s over the years evolved into a number of groups with different aims and tactics. At the moment any number of Islamic extremist terrorist groups are likely to be debating their future on two grounds:

- strategic—whether their struggle should take the form of a global or local jihad and whether their struggle should focus on the immediate struggle as opposed to the longer-term.
- tactical—whether the targets of their attacks should be foreigners, government and security officials or the wider civilian population.

Disagreements over terrorist tactics and the targeting of civilians in particular are not uncommon. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), now the most significant Islamist terrorist group in Algeria, broke off from the then primary Algerian terrorist movement, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1998. In fact at the time the GIA split into many factions and subgroups, what one analyst termed 'many little GIA's'. Of these the GSPC was the strongest and now arguably the most dangerous. The major reason for the split was that after the loss of some 100,000 lives in Algeria the GIA's support was weakening and the GSPC promised to avoid inflicting civilian casualties and instead would focus on Algerian Government and security forces.

The stated focus on avoiding civilian targets enabled the GSPC to attract new members and wider popular support. As a result the GSPC took over the position of primary terrorist group and has built up a larger support network than the GIA. However despite its original pledge the GSPC has subsequently targeted and killed civilians, albeit not on the same scale as the GIA. Part of the reason for switching back may be that civilians are softer targets. The GSPC is now seen as a major source of recruits and wider support for al-Qaeda operations and recent estimates say that one in five suicide bombers in Iraq is Algerian. The GSPC is now suffering its own factional problems while the GIA is considered to be essentially defunct. Some media reports have also pointed to GSPC links with the MILF with an emphasis on providing training assistance. The GSPC has also pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda and its objectives.

While a formal split in JI, if it happens, might diversify the terrorist threat, it could present as many opportunities as dangers. It would create openings for intelligence exploitation and the 'turning' of some JI members. But in exploiting a split so we also need to be aware of the dangers of encouraging—or at worst ignoring—the development of one terrorist group because it acts as a counter or competitor to another terrorist group. The Israeli Government's handling of the rise of Hamas is illustrative of those dangers. The Israelis are credited with having encouraged some elements of Hamas as a means of countering the influence and authority of the al-Fatah movement of Yasir Arafat.

Furthermore a central element behind the rift, and a major factor ensuring that the Indonesian Government takes the JI threat as seriously as we do, is JI's current disregard for the loss of Indonesian lives. Should JI solely and specifically target Westerners within Indonesia, it will become harder to maintain the degree of counter-terrorist cooperation that has been built up between Australia and Indonesia over the past two years.

In this respect JI could follow the operational example being attributed to al-Qaeda elements in the Middle East. Media reports late last year, citing Saudi experts, indicated that al-Qaeda forces in Saudi Arabia have shifted their strategy and are now focused almost exclusively on US and other Western targets while avoiding attacks on Saudi institutions in an effort to rebuild their network. These experts state that the Saudi al-Qaeda's campaign of car bombings and gun battles had failed to generate new recruits and created a backlash among Saudis. Apparently senior al-Qaeda leaders such as bin Laden and Zawahiri have urged local Saudi elements to press ahead with attacks irrespective of local casualties. Part of the new strategy involves the direct targeting of individuals including hostage taking. The December 2004 attack on the US consulate in Jeddah, when gunmen attempted to storm the building directly with armed terrorists rather than with a suicide car bomb, may have reflected this new strategy.

Protesters stage a demonstration calling for the end of terrorist acts in Jakarta, 17 September 2004. AP via AAP/Dita Alangkara

Islamic terrorism in Indonesia is at a crossroads

Questions remain about the future source of JI recruits. The pool of members of DI, family members and veterans of secessionist and sectarian conflict is probably large enough to keep JI supplied for the foreseeable future. The estimate of some tens of thousands of active DI members points to a long-term recruitment and regeneration base for JI and other like-minded organisations. The specific background of new JI recruits will help to determine the future direction of the organisation. If they have been educated in Indonesia and have been shaped mainly by Indonesian Islam, they may prefer an emphasis on internal sectarian conflict. If they have been educated in the Middle East, their focus may become the global jihad.

Possible future directions for JI include the following:

- JI continues on its current path in a loosely organised and structured way.
- A new Indonesian Islamic group takes over JI's membership and responsibilities.
- Al-Qaeda takes over JI remnants and uses them as part of its global jihad, in the same way it has taken over and used Algerian and Egyptian groups.
- JI returns to its DI roots, emphasising the longer-term struggle against the Indonesian state.
- JI returns to its anti-Christian roots, emphasising sectarian violence within Indonesia.
- JI splits formally into separate factions, with some factions advocating attacks on Australians and Americans, and others advocating domestic sectarian violence.
- Elements of JI engage in greater cooperation with criminal elements within Indonesia and the region.
- Recruitment and retention strategies are further developed, using Hamas and Hezbollah as role models, JI develops political, social, educational and welfare activities to strengthen their support possibly through Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's MMI organisation or some remaining DI elements.

Given the diversified and decentralised JI threat it's more than possible that more than one of these directions will be taken at the same time by different elements. The disparate nature of the targets and degree of effectiveness in attacks attributed to JI on page 51 might indicate that different elements of JI undertook those operations independently with varying degrees of success reflecting their respective professionalism.

Most analysis today emphasises the likelihood of JI returning to a main strategy of encouraging violence in sectarian conflicts within Indonesia ...

Most analysis today emphasises the likelihood of JI returning to a main strategy of encouraging violence in sectarian conflicts within Indonesia, not least as a means to regenerate and replenish its ranks and experience. At the time of writing, analysts were still divided as to whether the two bombs which exploded in Tentena on Sulawesi, killing twenty-one people and injuring more than thirty, are the work of JI elements. The reluctance

TERRORISM INCIDENTS IN INDONESIA 2004

Date	Type	Location	Target	Killed	Injured
01 Jan	Bombing	Aceh	Concert	10	45
05 Jan	Pipe bomb	Medan	Bus terminal	0	0
06 Jan	Armed attack	Aceh	Unknown	2	3
10 Jan	Pipe bomb	Sulawesi	Restaurant	4	3
05 Apr	Armed attack	Aceh	Polling station	0	2
10 Apr	Armed attack	Poso	Church	0	7
30 Apr	Bombing	Ambon	Unknown	0	13
04 May	Bombing	Pekanbaru	Grocery store	2	4
05 May	Armed attack	Wamkana	Public place	2	3
23 May	Bombing	Ambon	Market	1	5
24 May	Bombing	Bandar Lampung	Parliament office	0	0
25 May	Bombing	Ambon	Market	1	17
26 May	Assassination	Palu	Prosecutor	1	0
09 Jun	Firebombing	Yogyakarta	Church	0	0
14 July	Bombing	Bandung	Shopping center	0	0
18 July	Armed attack	Palu City	Church	5	0
20 July	Bombing	Medan	Unknown	1	2
26 July	Bombing	Jakarta	Polling station	0	0
05 Aug	Armed attack	Aceh	Vehicle	4	1
11 Aug	Bombing	Ambon	Public place	0	0
11 Aug	Bombing	Ambon	Public place	0	0
12 Aug	Kidnapping	Aceh	Civilians	0	0
17 Aug	Bombing	Aceh	Public place	0	7
18 Aug	Grenade attack	Aceh	Public place	0	4
19 Aug	Grenade attack	Aceh	Police station	0	6
22 Aug	Bombing	Poso	Police station	0	0
02 Sep	Bombing	Bogor	Shopping center	0	0
09 Sep	Bombing	Jakarta	Diplomatic	10	182
15 Sep	Bombing	Ambon	Bank branch	0	0
20 Sep	Bombing	Jalan Meranti	Police station	0	0
04 Oct	Assassination	Lhoknga	Election official	1	0
13 Nov	Bombing	Poso	Market	5	5
12 Dec	Armed attack	Palu	Church	0	2
12 Dec	Bombing	Palu	Church	0	4
Total				49	315

Source: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Database of 2004 Terrorist Incidents (Worldwide Incidents Tracking System—WITS)

Notes:

- The data provided consists of incidents in which subnational or clandestine groups or individuals deliberately or recklessly attacked civilians or noncombatants. Noncombatants refers to military personnel outside war zones and war-like settings. Hence it takes a relatively broad definition of terrorist incident.
- Terrorists must have initiated and executed an attack for it to be included in the database. Failed or foiled attacks are not included.
- The database presumably does not include any action initiated by government forces, for example Indonesian military offensives against Achenese rebels.
- The database is said to be the most comprehensive compilation of worldwide terrorism incidents ever released by the US Government. The NCTC says it is constantly refining its methodology and updating the database to provide the most accurate and useful terrorism-related data to the public. However the database does not seem to have included all attacks committed in Aceh.

of ordinary people in Central Sulawesi and Maluku to be drawn into a Muslim–Christian conflict in those areas might just incite jihadists to attempt to provoke such a conflict even more. Sunni insurgent attempts to incite civil war in Iraq is a case in point. The reluctance of the Shi'ites to openly respond to Sunni insurgent provocations has not stopped the insurgents from trying even harder.

A particularly worrying development would be JI, its offshoots and individual members using the tactics and experience developed during the past five years and directly applying those 'skills' towards sectarian conflict within Indonesia. A test of whether that is the case would be, for example the use of suicide or car bombs as a tactic in sectarian conflict, which would be a major step up given that such tactics up to now have been reserved for attacks against Western targets.

However if JI returns to its sectarian roots, policy makers in Australia may be tempted to conclude that JI is no longer a threat to Australia. They would be twice mistaken. First, such a change in JI's tactics could be only for the short term. Having been inspired on an anti-Western course since the attacks of 9/11, it's doubtful that JI or its successors would ever completely lose sight of that aim, especially if Australia is perceived to be standing in the way of their objective, namely an Indonesian Islamic state. Furthermore given the nature of the possible rift within JI it's likely that an anti-Western faction will always be present in some form or another. A split could actually lead such a faction to intensify its attacks, not least as part of a potential power struggle within JI. In down playing future communal conflict in Indonesia we might also run the risk of repeating the mistakes with our intelligence assessments of JI pre-Bali bombings, that it was just a domestic terrorist group focused on sectarian conflict solely within Indonesia.

More importantly, a JI that focuses on fomenting sectarian and secessionist conflict within Indonesia and destabilises the country is arguably a greater threat to Australian national and strategic interests than a JI that specifically targets Australian nationals. For example, while 10 people were killed and 182 injured in the September 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, four times that many people were killed in terrorist incidents of a secessionist or communal nature in Indonesia that year also (see box on previous page). Of the thirty-four terrorist attacks in Indonesia carried out during 2004 only one was JI connected while at least another two (4 May and 13 November) are said to be suspected by Indonesian authorities of being JI-related.

We can only guess what JI et al will do next

The fact that the September 2004 attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta didn't kill any Australians led some commentators to 'predict' that JI would mount a second attack, most likely on a softer target. But while a future JI attack may be inevitable, we shouldn't necessarily assume that JI in hindsight looks on the embassy bombing as a failure. Although there are indicators the bomb was not as effective as originally planned we simply don't know how JI measures success or failure.

If the aim was to kill as many Australians as possible, the operation could be seen as a failure, although the reason for attacking a relatively hard target remains unknown. It's possible that JI needed to switch targets quickly to retain operational security. Based on this reasoning, the next target could well be a much more vulnerable one. That the Bali bombings followed the failed 2001 operation against foreign embassies in Singapore strengthens this argument. However, if JI's aim was to demonstrate its continued relevance

and existence some thirteen months after the Marriott Hotel bombing, the Jakarta embassy operation can be seen as somewhat of a success.

To date JI's major terrorist operations have been limited in their originality and highly repetitive, namely bombings, most recently with male suicide bombers and vehicles being the primary method of attack. Since 9/11 these attacks have also occurred largely just within Jakarta. This contrasts highly with other terrorist groups, most notably the Chechens who have proven capable of mass casualty bombings (against both buildings and transport infrastructure), targeted bombings, assassinations, use of female suicide bombers, mass hostage seizures, aircraft bombings in mid-flight as well as more general insurgent and guerrilla operations. Last year the Chechens even proved capable of using three different tactics in the space of a few weeks (downing two airliners, bombing the Moscow subway and the Beslan hostage massacre).

Assuming the recent bombings in Sulawesi were not the handiwork of JI (or at least the work of the Top/Azhari 'faction' of JI) then the last JI attack was the Australian Embassy bombing some twelve months ago. Up until now JI's method of operation has seen major operations conducted in roughly one year cycles, the Christmas bombings in December 2000, the plot against Singapore embassies in December 2001, the Bali bombing in October 2002, the Marriott bombing of August 2003 and the Australian Embassy bombing of September 2004. This seems to reflect the time necessary to adequately plan for an operation typical of the complexity of a suicide car bombing.

Therefore the absence of any other type of JI operation (such as kidnapping, assassination, maritime attacks or less sophisticated bombings) since the last bombing may well signify that JI is sticking to its current repertoire, namely a suicide car bomb against a Western target in Jakarta sometime over the next few months. That possibility may well be reflected in recent Australian, US and Indonesian Government warnings about imminent terrorist

An Indonesian firefighter walks past the damaged JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta after an explosion, 9 September 2004.
AFP via AAP/ Choo Youn-Kong © 2004 AFP

attacks. On 17 May 2005 the Indonesian police warned about possible future suicide bombings in Jakarta. In late May the US closed its embassy in Jakarta and its consulates in Surabaya, Medan and Bali amid reports of possible terrorist threats and after plans to attack the US Embassy had been posted on an Indonesian language web site. The US Embassy in Jakarta warned of possible bombings at hotels frequented by Westerners in Jakarta in early June this year.

On 9 June the Indonesian police said there had been an increase in communication among militants indicating they were planning fresh strikes. Embassies, international schools, office buildings, hotels, global corporations and shopping malls would all have to be considered possible targets. Media reports indicated that the terrorist tactics behind the July 2005 bombings in London—namely multiple attacks using small explosives carried by individuals in public places—are similar to the the predicted methods of attack that led the US Embassy in Jakarta to issue the series of warnings highlighted above. While Indonesian authorities have made the operating environment far more difficult for JI operatives after the Bali bombings, JI's ability to carry out the Marriott Hotel and Australian Embassy bombings some two years after Bali would suggest that it's not an entirely impossible environment to continue to operate in. However it might be so restrictive as to force JI into using smaller packages of explosives similar to the London bombings.

In mid-2004 media reports quoting Western intelligence sources indicated that JI was preparing for the assassination of diplomats and business people ...

That being said it would also be dangerous to place too much emphasis on a terrorist group's past actions as a guide to their future operations. Russia's experience in Chechnya is but one example. While the Chechens had previously focused on bombings, hostage taking and assassinations as their typical repertoire, last year they proved quite capable of expanding those tactics to include bombing airliners in mid-flight. Just because they hadn't used that method previously did not mean they were not willing or capable of doing so. Furthermore prior to the Bali bombing JI hadn't utilised suicide bombers but now it seems to have become a typical method of attack. In mid-2004 media reports quoting Western intelligence sources indicated that JI was preparing for the assassination of diplomats and business people, a tactic they are suspected of having previously trained for. One of their first operations was the attempted assassination of the Philippines Ambassador, albeit with a remotely detonated bomb. Other militants have undertaken targeted killings in places such as Poso, though not against Western targets.

The RAND Corporation's terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman has made the point that, rather than asking what could or couldn't happen with respect to future terrorist attacks, we might more profitably focus on understanding what *hasn't* happened so far. Asking why terrorists haven't committed certain types of attacks could also shed light on possible future attacks. Using some of Hoffman's examples, we might ask why JI has not:

- attacked the Indonesian Government and state more directly
- planned or undertaken a major attack more often than every twelve months or so

- used man-portable air defence systems or rocket-propelled grenades to attack civil aviation
- engaged in more maritime terrorist attacks in the region
- carried out attacks against Indonesia's economic infrastructure, especially oil-related targets
- exploited the potential of limited, discrete use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and cyberattacks
- used assassinations or targeted killings more widely
- undertaken hostage sieges in the style of Chechen fighters
- used the twin tactic of kidnapping and beheading, which has been used in the Philippines and Iraq
- been more involved in criminal activities to finance its activities
- attempted to mount a serious counter-counterterrorist campaign, specifically targeting police and intelligence operations as well as international cooperation.

Brian Jenkins, Hoffman's colleague at RAND, made the point that 'terrorists haven't always done things that we know they're capable of doing. With unlimited targets, they focus on a few. Their tactical repertoire is often limited and repetitive. They often operate below what we believe to be their capacity. Almost any one of us could think of dreadful things we could do if we were terrorists, crueller things, more clever things. Why is this so?'

Jenkins says that we find some explanations by altering our perspective from targeted audience to terrorist actor. He raises as possible rationales such issues as morality, self-image as legitimate military combatants, concerns about group cohesion, worries about alienating perceived constituents, fears of provoking devastating backlashes and crackdowns, risks of tactical failure, group decision-making, the need to prevent fragmentation, and differing perceptions of difficulty.

We need a wide range of intelligence and information to answer all the questions raised earlier, but we also need to develop a far better understanding of terrorists, especially of what motivates them and how they measure success. Some measures to address this gap in understanding are included below in the policy response section of this chapter.

JI is still far from achieving its aims and objectives

It's only natural for us to judge the success or otherwise of our counter-terrorism policies by JI's ability to attack us. However, this tendency often prevents us from placing the terrorist threat in Indonesia in a proper perspective, and causes us to lose sight of the bigger picture. While JI may have some tactical success in being able to undertake terrorist operations, its ability to realise strategic success, the establishment of an Islamic state, is far more limited.

By most accounts the radical Islamist revival in Indonesia has stalled and in some cases gone into reverse. In fact the wave of post-9/11 terrorist bombings undertaken by JI may have directly contributed to that reversal. So it's fair to say that radical Islamism is unlikely to make any substantial headway within Indonesia in the short to medium term. However, in the April 2004 round of parliamentary elections, Islamist political parties increased their support to 21.3% of the vote—up from 16% in 1999. While there seems to be little support for an Islamist president, the vote at the parliamentary level has been steadily improving. Some analysts, such as Zachary Abuza, believe that the Islamists have set their sights on

the 2009 election to make even greater gains, not least on an anti-corruption platform. Parties such as Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), while Islamist in nature, have no connections with groups such as JI though they possibly would indirectly benefit from a radicalisation of the Indonesian electorate. But the continued use of terrorism by groups such as JI as the primary if not sole means to achieve their goals is likely to make the task of mainstream Islamist political parties that more difficult. Where terrorism has worked in the past as a means of achieving political power it has been used in a far more limited fashion and part of a broader political strategy. It certainly loses its appeal and relevance as a major tactic with the passage of time.

Any failure to pursue political and economic reform is likely to lead to increased support for the Islamists, but overreacting to events will also feed the threat.

The future appeal of radical Islam in Indonesia also largely depends on the future policies and reactions of the Indonesian Government. Political repression, lack of governance, socioeconomic deprivation and cultural alienation have all contributed to past periodic rises in Islamic violence in Indonesia. Any failure to pursue political and economic reform is likely to lead to increased support for the Islamists, but overreacting to events will also feed the threat. The recent action in southern Thailand, which resulted in the deaths in custody of seventy-eight Muslims, demonstrates the danger that a government's overreaction to a threat can make the problem worse. How the Indonesian Government reacts to secessionist and sectarian conflict in places like Poso and Ambon will be important factors in the growth of radical Islam and the development of groups such as JI. The key to limiting the future growth of jihadist terrorism in Indonesia lies in the ability to prevent or resolve internal communal conflicts.

Another, far more serious scenario is possible. If the Islamists do so well electorally that the TNI sees them as a threat to secular nationalism and overturns a democratic election result, the outcome could be much like events in Algeria in 1992. Military intervention in Algeria ushered in a decade of extreme violence that resulted in some 150,000 deaths. It also pushed some previously non-violent Islamists onto the path to terrorism. While Algeria might be a worst-case scenario, any attempt to disenfranchise Indonesian Islamists or Islamist parties could have similar effects. Australia's policies should be geared to avoiding such a situation.

The response

What are we fighting—terrorism or radical Islam?

One of the major problems of waging a 'global campaign against terrorism' is attempting to define what it is that we're actually trying to combat. Words such as *fundamentalist*, *Islamist*, *terrorist*, *jihadist*, *wahabist*, *salafist* and *salafi jihadist* are too often used almost interchangeably, when they really mean very different things.

Since the US's adoption of the term 'global war on terror' to describe its campaign against al-Qaeda, there's been a fairly vigorous debate about whether this term has any utility, and

whether it could prove to be not only misleading but also dangerous. Its use has obvious public relations appeal; it's debatable whether any government would want to explain how 'war against radical Islam' doesn't actually mean 'war against Islam in general', particularly when you consider what could be lost in translation.

Defining our terms forces us to define what we're trying to fight. While 'global war on terror' is PR-friendly in one sense, it would seem to be more accurate to see the US-led campaign as a campaign against radical Islamism, particularly but not exclusively where it manifests as terrorism with global reach. This has become even more relevant since the US Administration has tied its efforts to spread democracy throughout the world squarely as part of its counter-terrorist strategy.

President Bush himself challenged his own notion of a war on terror when he said in late 2004, 'We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be called the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies and who happen to use

An Indonesian youth prays at Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta during Ramadan October 2004. AFP via AAP/Bay Ismoyo © 2004 AFP

terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world.' This eventually led to some thinking within the US Administration about the need to retool its branding of the campaign against al-Qaeda to take account of the more political and ideological nature of the struggle. Further US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld spoke of 'a global struggle against violent extremism'. However the possibility of a redefinition seems to have stalled as President Bush's speech in early August 2005 made it perfectly clear that the phrase 'war on terror' was the more accurate and definitive characterisation of US policy and strategy.

The Australian Government has continually made its case that the campaign against terrorism isn't a war on Islam. What the government hasn't made clear, however, is whether Australia's campaign is against terrorism per se, radical Islamism, terrorism by radical Islamists, or terrorism by radical Islamists against Australians. Reading the government's Terrorism White Paper, it's easy to come to the conclusion that we're not overly worried about the development of political Islam or its future prospects. Rather, it's the use of terrorism by jihadists that we seem to be more concerned with.

... while the US is really fighting against radical Islamism, Australia's fight is actually a purer 'campaign against terrorism'.

A case can be made that while the US is really fighting against radical Islamism, Australia's fight is actually a purer 'campaign against terrorism'. The vast bulk of the funding provided since 9/11 to combat terrorism has been focused on preventing and combating terrorism, rather than the ideology of radical Islam. But in a recent speech Defence Minister Robert Hill stated that it was useful to put the terrorist threat squarely in the broader context of Islamic extremism and the desire of extreme groups to establish an Islamic caliphate. By the same token the emphasis in the government's Terrorism White Paper on the need to wage a 'battle of ideas' would seem to suggest a greater concern with the ideological aspects of the struggle against terrorism.

By knowing what we're fighting, we also give ourselves a way to measure the success or otherwise of our counter-terrorist policies. If the aim of policy makers is to minimise the physical threat to Australian citizens, then policies that take JI back to its pre-9/11 roots will probably suffice. But those policies won't be enough if we are more concerned about the development of radical Islamism as an ideology and political movement within Indonesia.

But in attempting to wage a 'battle of ideas' we need to be realistic as to what the actual contribution of Western countries to an ideological struggle can and should be. One problem is that one can only really discredit the ideology of radical Islamism once it does succeed in taking control of a greater number of countries. That way its record in office presumably would help to undermine its appeal, as did the record of communism in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and throughout the Third World. The experience and history of Islamic governments in Iran, Sudan and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan so far has apparently not been sufficient to discredit the ideology more widely and generally, at least in the Muslim world.

More importantly, while it might be popular to think that our values and way of life would appeal to all nations and peoples, Western countries do not necessarily have an ideological alternative to offer those attracted to the jihadist's view of the world. That's what sets this ideological struggle so apart from that faced during the Cold War. After all if you follow the government's logic as to why we are terrorist targets it's who we are and what we believe in that's the problem. So it would make sense that the wider Muslim population that might support the terrorists aims—but not their tactics—would share that view.

In some respects even cultivating moderate Muslims may not be enough. Countries like Indonesia and Turkey do represent an alternative vision of secular Islamic countries but there may also be limits to that appeal. So as the government develops ideas to engage

Scoring the global war on terror

On a broader strategic level and without oversimplifying the issue, the scorecard in the overall global war on terror can probably be best summed up as follows: counter-terrorism actions since the attacks of 9/11 have certainly dented the capability of various terrorist groups, not least al-Qaeda proper. But these same actions, along with the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, has probably led to an increase in the motivation and intent of these groups and new groups and individuals, to attacks the US and its allies. While the experience of al-Qaeda members can be assumed to have decreased, their overall numbers have probably increased. That points to us achieving success at the tactical level while somewhat failing at the strategic level. While we may have decreased the short-term threat it's probably been at the expense of increasing the longer-term threat of terrorism.

One recent analysis of foreign Arabs killed in fighting in Iraq undertaken by an Israeli think tank reveals that the vast majority were not terrorists or insurgents prior to the US-led invasion or occupation of Iraq. That would suggest that the ongoing insurgency in Iraq is what radicalised them and led them down the path of jihadism. The lack of a terrorist background of the 7 July 2005 London bombers and the suspected amateurism of the 21 July 2005 London bombers might also reflect their more recent radicalisation. It underscores the importance of preventing the rise of a second generation of terrorists at the same time as fighting the current generation. Iraq didn't create the threat of terrorism but it has increased it. It's simply inconsistent to maintain that Iraq is the central front in the war on terror yet at the same time has no effect on the level of the threat of terrorism.

On the more positive side it's not as easily said that the Iraq conflict has produced the same affect in the regional fight against JI and like-minded groups. As Sidney Jones has stated, there is no evidence that anger over the war in Iraq, which is widespread across Indonesia, is actually producing new and different kinds of recruits. That may yet indicate that the 'global jihad' has limited value as a recruitment tool for Islamic extremists in Indonesia compared to more local communal conflicts. While JI has suffered considerable losses since the 2002 Bali attacks there's no similar evidence of a widening of their motivation or support or in their recruitment base. In fact there seems to be increasing evidence of a fracturing and splintering of their organisation and support base. However that could still create other problems of its own.

the wider Indonesian Islamic community it should also try to engage some of the more fundamentalist Islamic scholars and organisations who object to the use of terrorism. While they may object to Western culture, US foreign policy and the like, we need to test whether their disapproval for JI's tactics outweighs such considerations in the longer term. We need to ensure that we don't limit ourselves to cultivating friendly, moderate Muslims as the primary means to counter the message and appeal of groups such as JI and al-Qaeda. Although the willingness of the Australian Government to do so depends largely on what threat it is ultimately combating, the tactic of terrorism or the ideology of radical Islamism.

Is Indonesia part of the global war on terror?

From many perspectives, not least in the US, the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 was seen as a declaration, if not an act of war. The scale of the attacks probably made the use of the term 'global war on terror' (GWOT) an appropriate response at the time. But whatever relevance the term had then it was lost soon after the fall of the Taliban and the scattering of al-Qaeda. And ever since the US Administration placed the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq squarely within the strategy of the GWOT the term ceased to have wide support.

... it's doubtful whether the Indonesian Government sees its campaign against JI as part of a US-led effort or even as a 'war' in a solely Indonesian context.

While it may be useful to the US to pursue a 'global' response to terrorism as one universal doctrine or strategy, the reality is that there are many 'wars' or campaigns against terrorism, some loosely connected and not all of them following the US line. The US global approach has its greatest application and relevance where the US is actually leading the campaign against terrorism, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. However in places such as Indonesia, the notion of a global response has far less application and it's doubtful whether the Indonesian Government sees its campaign against JI as part of a US-led effort or even as a 'war' in a solely Indonesian context.

Australia is a formal partner in the US-led GWOT, however, some key differences can be found in the two respective countries' approach to combating the contemporary threat of terrorism. While Australian Ministerial speeches contain many references to a 'war on terror' (but not so much *the global* war on terror) more official references to Australia's counter-terrorist policies are more often described as a 'fight against international terrorism' or a 'global campaign against terror'. While the US tends to see Southeast Asia as the 'second front' in the global war on terror Australia refers to our immediate neighbourhood as a 'major arena in the war against terrorism' or 'a front line'. When talking of JI, the US uses terms such as al-Qaeda 'franchise' or 'affiliate' whereas Australia sees the organisation as 'an associated group' or 'willing ally' of al-Qaeda.

Finally while Australia may be a partner in the global 'war' the government's policies and speeches confirm that our priority in combating terrorism rests far more with our immediate neighbourhood. The White Paper on terrorism states that it is in our own region where Australia has its greatest commitment and contribution to make in combating

terrorism. JI is identified as the principal terrorist threat both to Australian interests and across the region. And in a speech to the French Institute of International Relations in February 2005 Foreign Minister Downer stated that while working towards enhanced global counter-terrorism cooperation the Asia–Pacific region remains the major focus of Australia's practical assistance.

... fighting a 'global campaign against terrorism' will require discrete responses to different terrorist threats in different parts of the world; this is not a campaign in which 'one size fits all'.

The White Paper makes the point that at the hard edge of Australia's contribution to the global campaign against terror is the use of military force, noting that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been engaged twice in major military operations against terrorism, in Afghanistan and Iraq. This also provides a clear distinction to how Australia combats terrorism within our own region, where the bulk of support given to countries like Indonesia and the Philippines is far more likely to involve the Australian Federal Police (AFP) than the ADF.

What this all means is that fighting a 'global campaign against terrorism' will require discrete responses to different terrorist threats in different parts of the world; this is not a campaign in which 'one size fits all'. Disrupting al-Qaeda's organisation, operations and links to regional groups such as JI is an important task, but won't be enough to deal with the threat from JI or its successors in our region. In addition to our global efforts, we also require a regional strategy and solutions tailored to deal with regional problems.

The Australian Government's response so far

The Australian Government's strategy for combating terrorism has been spelt out in a number of documents and speeches. The most notable are *Protecting Australia Against Terrorism*, released by the Prime Minister in June 2004, and the White Paper, *Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia*, released by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in July 2004.

Protecting Australia sets out the key elements of Australia's national framework for counter-terrorism policy and arrangements. It focuses on near-term domestic protection and also devotes some attention to international and regional aspects. It deals with hard material actions that the government can take under national sovereign arrangements. *Protecting Australia* is designed to complement the White Paper on terrorism, which explores the strategic and long-term international dimensions of the terrorist threat and the basis of Australia's counter-terrorism efforts with other countries. The tone of the White Paper is therefore less assertive in terms of actions and achievements. Each document provides information on the government's approaches to the terrorist threat, and together they are intended to give a picture of our overall national strategy.

For all the limitations in *Protecting Australia*'s response to combating terrorism overseas (which admittedly is not its stated purpose) the White Paper doesn't come close to developing a similar type of comprehensive framework as *Protecting Australia* does.

Australia's counter-terrorism framework

The Australian Government's stated strategy for protecting Australia against terrorism has domestic and international elements. At the Australian Strategy Policy Institute (ASPI) annual dinner in June 2004 the Prime Minister spoke of the Australian Government having a 'three pronged approach' to counter-terrorism, namely,

- better laws
- stronger terrorism fighting agencies
- enhanced international cooperation.

The Australian Government's strategy as contained in *Protecting Australia* has three main elements:

- Preparedness—a strong ability to detect and disrupt terrorist activity
- Prevention—strong protection of our people, assets and infrastructure from terrorist activity
- Response—rapid and effective capabilities to reduce the impact of a terrorist incident should one occur.

Protecting Australia is primarily about domestic security. The emphasis is overwhelmingly on tactical and domestic measures such as enhancing the security legislative framework, better intelligence, improved coordination, increased border security protection of critical infrastructure and the like. However, of the twelve policy points that make up preparedness and prevention, one deals with the need to actively promote international engagement.

As set out in *Protecting Australia* the government's international strategy addresses three broad objectives:

- building political will to combat terrorism through greater international and regional cooperation
- delivering practical results against terrorists through effective operational-level cooperation
- sharing our experience and training to strengthen regional capabilities.

These objectives are supported by three broad areas of activity:

- strengthening relationships with allies and key partners and practical engagement with the region
- participation in regional and multilateral forums on combating terrorism
- developing programs of cooperation to increase regional capabilities.

continued over

The White Paper says the government has a comprehensive international counter-terrorism strategy. However in order to find a framework of the type in *Protecting Australia* to explain that strategy largely requires delving through twenty-six pages of descriptive text and coming to your own conclusions.

Australia's counter-terrorism framework *continued*

The longer-term is not ignored in the Government's strategy because it is clearly recognised that the response to terrorism will be an intergenerational undertaking, although the nature of response will need to be periodically reviewed and adjusted. The strategy contemplates "proactive intervention" in pursuit of two important threads:

- countering the appeal of extremists and encouraging alternative, more constructive approaches; and
- breaking down the conditions in which extremism and terrorism can prosper;
- by fighting a "battle of ideas", de-legitimising terrorism as an option, and addressing the phenomenon of failed and failing states, primarily through support given to regional governments.

The longer-term strategy is short on detail, although this might reflect the sensitivity of the subject matter and the need for flexibility.

At last count the Australian Government has implemented over a hundred security measures to combat terrorism at a cost of more than $5.6 billion over the next five years or so. The government approach addresses measures that impact at the global, regional, national and local levels. In the 2005–06 Budget an extra $1.1billion in additional resources was provided to meet the Australian Government's fourth term counter-terrorism agenda. Of this some $60 million was provided for international counter-terrorism cooperation.

That doesn't mean that the White Paper doesn't contain useful information not found in *Protecting Australia*. For example the White Paper recognises that terrorism is an enduring long-term threat. Another positive of the White Paper is that it also recognises that the campaign against extremist Muslim terrorism involves a contest or battle of ideas that requires addressing the economic, social and political factors that create the conditions in which extremism can take root and flourish. At the same time, however, talk within Australia of closing down Islamic bookshops, deporting radical clerics and banning groups that aren't necessarily terrorist as part of future government measures would seem to be a tacit admission that we can't win this 'battle of ideas', hence the apparently greater reliance on punitive measures to stop the appeal of radical Islamism.

The need to develop a coherent and long-term regional strategy to combat JI et al

Australia needs a coherent long-term strategy to combat the threat posed by jihadist terrorism in Indonesia and the wider region. Most of what has been initiated so far can best be described as tactical responses to events rather than pro-active intervention. The strategy needs to go beyond the broad objectives outlined in the published documents and address the range of enabling initiatives that will contribute to their achievement. The basis and framework of such a strategy would be as follows:

- Clearly identify and define what it is we are fighting, a tactic or an ideology
- Recognise the nature of the threat we face free of politics or emotion
- Work out the appropriate long term and interdisciplinary initiatives to fight it

- Develop tangible measures of success so we can continually assess the strategy [see box on p. 72–73]
- Have a clear sense of what achieving victory might mean—if it's achievable.

Much of what has been published provides some of the answers to the first three points, but there is little, if any, discussion of the last two.

... rather than Australia's counter-terrorism strategy forming part of the overall GWOT, it's the GWOT that forms just one small plank of our overall counter-terrorism strategy.

Another rationale of the strategy would be to explain the relevance of the GWOT to Australia's response to terrorism. The GWOT does have a role to play in Australia's campaign against terrorism, particularly as it relates to US-led campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as providing an umbrella for wider intelligence cooperation. But rather than Australia's counter-terrorism strategy forming part of the overall GWOT, it's the GWOT that forms just one small plank of our overall counter-terrorism strategy. The GWOT concept certainly has limited application in determining what our response should be to counter extremist Islamic terrorism in Indonesia.

The government's White Paper on Terrorism provided the opportunity to develop such a strategy, but the focus and rationale of that paper seems to have been more on public information than on policy direction. Comparison with the 2000 Defence White Paper is worthwhile. The heart of the Defence White Paper is a ten-year Defence Capability Plan tied to a guaranteed 3% annual increase in defence funding through that decade. The Terrorism White Paper and associated government policy initiatives, however, seem rarely to be projected beyond four to five years, and there's no comprehensive plan to build up and fund counter-terrorist capabilities within Australia or the region over the long term in a similar fashion. By comparison the French Government is reported to be currently drafting a White Paper on terrorism that will lay guidelines for the next 15 years and lead to the adoption of a spending plan on counter-terrorism similar to France's longer-term defence programs.

While terrorism, unlike traditional defence concerns, is a direct and immediate threat to Australian interests, the time needed to combat the threat effectively has to be measured in decades. Efforts to improve perceptions of Australia in the region, nation-building with failing South Pacific states, developing intelligence analysts or addressing the Indonesian education system will take as long as, or even longer than, developing a new air or naval combat capability.

We've gone beyond the point where agencies such as Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade are our primary actors against terrorism in the region. We've already given agencies such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the AFP an expanded regional role. We've now arrived at the stage when departments such as Treasury, Finance, Education and Immigration, among others, all have important roles to play.

For example, Australia's longer-term strategy to combat regional terrorism requires us to assist Indonesia to build a strong, stable and just society. Whether we've done all we can to

further that strategy is open to question. Part of the long-term process involves furthering democracy and civilian control of the military, and while engaging with Indonesian Special Forces (KOPASSUS) might assist the short-term counter-terrorist campaign, it's arguable whether that engagement aids the long-term strategy. Our immigration policy also has implications for the long term. Our efforts to improve the image of Australia in the region may prove less effective in the face of an immigration policy that is perceived as being prejudiced against Muslims. All our policy areas are connected to one degree or another.

Australia's counter-terrorism strategy is largely tailored to the threat faced today—focused on a JI that continues to rely solely on terrorism to realise its strategic objectives.

A dedicated, regional strategy or policy to combat terrorism entails some risks if it's not implemented properly. The very existence of such a policy could lead to its pursuit separately from, rather than within, the conduct of Australia's wider foreign policy. That's why the counter-terrorist policy must be coordinated and consistent.

Australia's counter-terrorism strategy is largely tailored to the threat faced today—focused on a JI that continues to rely solely on terrorism to realise its strategic objectives. Considering that Australia's knowledge and experience with counter-terrorism only really dates from the 2000 Sydney Olympics the government can be said to have made a reasonable start to the development of the appropriate frameworks and strategies to combat terrorism.

Measuring success against terrorism

Tlhe most obvious standard measure of success is the absence of a terrorist attack. The problem with relying on that measure is it's based on past acts rather than future possibilities. Just because an attack hasn't happened yet doesn't mean one isn't currently being planned, 9/11 and the London bombings are evidence of that fact. Other measures include the numbers of terrorists killed or captured (the 'body count') and finances seized or frozen. But if you don't know how many recruits or funds terrorists had to begin with, let alone how many they've raised since, then those measures have rather limited value.

Developing appropriate measures of success depends on your criteria for success or victory: stop all terrorism, or just contain it and bring it down to a manageable level, ie pre-9/11. We also need to distinguish between tactical versus strategic success or short-term versus long-term success. To use a Vietnam analogy you can win all the battles but still lose the war.

continued

Measuring success against terrorism *continued*

The Australian Federal Police are currently working with the University of Queensland to overcome the problems associated with developing measures of success in counter-terrorism. Measures of success are not necessarily the same as performance measures, which are more of an audit and accountability measure. Measures of success are more qualitative than performance measures though they can also have some quantitative aspects. Measures of success are based against terrorist incidents whereas performance measures are calculated against counter-terrorist initiatives. Given the nature of a threat we can't just talk of measuring success on an annual or financial year basis. Success needs to be measured on a constant and ongoing basis. ASPI will also develop appropriate performance measures when it undertakes its planned audit of the government's national security measures initiated since 2001.

Part of the solution is not to treat the terrorist threat we face today as a predominantly global phenomenon but to break it down into its regional and national parts. For example a measure of success in combating terrorism in Iraq may have no relevance to the fight in Indonesia. But despite the problems faced some of the measures of success that could be usefully considered would include:

- Regular and consistent polling of Indonesian attitudes on an elite and mass basis (see below). Similar attitude surveys should also be done of the Australian population.
- Ongoing assessment of the political development and rehabilitation of jailed terrorists.
- Studies of killed and captured terrorists to assess their background, experience, motivation, basis of recruitment, training etc.
- Development of a dedicated and consistent database of terrorist incidents in Indonesia and the Philippines, similar to data compiled by NCTC, including their degree of sophistication and professionalism. In contrast to other databases it should also list counter-terrorist incidents.
- Trend analysis in terrorists' activities including whether their capabilities are increasing, the number of tips offs to Indonesian authorities, numbers of terrorist defectors/surrenders etc.
- Comprehensive assessment of attempted and thwarted terrorist attacks, particularly as directly measured against the security initiatives that prevented them.
- Assessment of how terrorists themselves measure success and failure and learn from their own operations.

This data would not necessarily be made available publicly, doing so would run the risk that the information would be clouded by political imperatives. For example statistics on terrorism incidents raises questions as to whether a certain incident is a terrorist act or one with greater legitimacy.

While they both have holes, *Protecting Australia* and the Terrorism White Paper provide the government with a basis to further evolve their policies to deal with what is likely to prove to be a highly adaptive and flexible threat. Part of that future evolution might have to involve a greater focus by the government on whether radical Islamist ideology is as great a threat to Australian strategic interests as the use of terrorism.

Police officers and a bomb-sniffing dog stand guard outside the court house where radical Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is scheduled to attend his trial in Jakarta, Indonesia, 2 September 2003. AP via AAP/Dita Alangkara © 2003 AP

To this day the Australian Government's counter-terrorist campaign has largely focused on combating terrorism and terrorist groups. One indicator as to whether that campaign will be broadened to combat more of the radical Islamist ideology that underpins much of that terrorism will be if the Australian government eventually bans the Hizb ut-Tahrir group. Described as the 'intellectual vanguard' of the radical Islamist movement or as the 'political cover' for al-Qaeda, Hizb ut-Tahrir while a highly radical Islamist organisation, is not an actual terrorist group. It claims to reject the use of violence and terrorism though some of its teachings and beliefs would seem to provide justification for militant action.

A new strategy might also have to consider a JI that does become more like an insurgency in the longer-term. One of the rationales causing the current rift within JI is the strategy to ease off its terror campaign in order to build up the recruitment, network, support base and military capabilities so it can become more like DI and begin to challenge the Indonesian Government more openly and directly. But a JI that's stops or slows down its current terror campaign in the interests of rebuilding its wider capabilities for a future fight may only end up becoming a longer-term threat to Australia.

Developing a comprehensive list of initiatives to combat terrorism on a regional level is beyond the brief of this report, however, three areas stand out as worthy of immediate attention—public diplomacy, intelligence analysis and capacity-building.

Finding out what Indonesians think of us

Government-sponsored programs to inform or influence public opinion in other countries are well-established tools for countering image problems overseas. The Australian Government has announced a number of initiatives to wage a battle of ideas. These include developing an exchange program to bring Islamic scholars to Australia, hosting inter-faith dialogue and supporting state-run secular educational projects in Indonesia. However, without a baseline measurement of the problem, it's difficult to assess the success of such initiatives.

One example of baselining is the Pew Global Attitudes Project, a series of worldwide opinion surveys to assess America's image in the world. The project's 2003 report, *Views of a Changing World*, focused on international reactions to changes in society, and specifically on globalisation, modernisation, democratisation and the role of Islam in public policy, particularly in Muslim countries. The report found that favourable views of the US have fallen from 61% to 15% in Indonesia. Similar surveys were organised in 2002 by the Research Centre for the Study of Islam and Society and by the Gallup Poll. These surveys don't reveal whether similar attitudes were held about Australia, let alone what those views are today.

A conference was held in Canberra in August 2004 to improve our understanding of how Islamic communities, particularly in Southeast Asia, view questions about state, society and governance. At the conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that what we've seen emerging from the mainstream Muslim majority across the region is a strong preference for pluralist and democratic approaches to the state and society. While initiatives like the Canberra conference on Islam and society are obviously a good idea, we should use surveys to canvass the views of Indonesians directly.

The 2003 Pew Project found that only 40% of Indonesians believed that it's very important to live in a country that has honest multi-party elections. Furthermore, the survey found that reservations about Western-style democracy were greater in Indonesia than in the other countries polled, and that reservations had increased since 2002. At the same time as the

Australian and Indonesian Governments hosted an International Dialogue on Interfaith Co-operation in December last year research by the Jakarta-based Freedom Institute revealed greater support for terrorist attacks among Indonesians than was thought to be the case. Details of negative attitudes towards Australia and America that were revealed in the survey were apparently held back by the US Embassy in Jakarta who commissioned the work. Polls of Indonesian opinion undertaken by the Asia Foundation (February 2003) and the International Foundation for Election Systems (June/July 2003) revealed similar concerns.

But events do change opinions. A poll taken by the Terror Free Tomorrow organisation after the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami relief effort revealed that more people favoured US led efforts to combat terrorism than opposed them (40% to 36%). The poll also showed that support for Osama bin Laden dropped significantly and 65% of Indonesians were now more favourable to the US because of the America response to the tsunami. The latest Pew poll shows similar trends. It remains unknown however to what degree the recent revelations about inappropriate handling of the Koran by US officials at Guantanamo Bay prison have affected this positive thought. At the time the story broke thousands of Indonesian protesters took to the streets of Jakarta in anti-US demonstrations.

While these polls all go some way towards establishing a baseline of Indonesian attitudes to Australia and the terrorists, they aren't dedicated studies of either. Furthermore the varied methodological approach taken in each poll decreases their value overall, especially in assessing opinion consistently over a longer period of time. The government regularly monitors Indonesian public opinion and media commentary through various agencies and also uses a range of tools as part of its public diplomacy strategy in Indonesia, including the programs managed by the Australia–Indonesia Institute. But these programs need to be tailored specifically to the development of a counter-terrorism strategy. Therefore, the government should consider developing an 'Indonesian Attitudes Project' to provide ongoing and consistent data and analysis on the Indonesian population's attitudes to terrorism, Australia, the role of Islam in public policy, and the like.

The aid from Australia to the Indonesian people after the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami shows what can actually be achieved in improving our image abroad.

Once a baseline of Indonesian opinion has been established, developing a suitable public diplomacy strategy and judging its effectiveness will be more feasible. In framing a public diplomacy strategy, the government should take care to ensure that the strategy doesn't become government-dominated. Outsourcing elements of the strategy, and enlisting business, non-government organisations and academia in any public diplomacy effort, should be a priority. But we also need to ensure that we don't treat public diplomacy the same way as the US seems to be heading, namely that public diplomacy can compensate for having bad or objectionable foreign policy overall. If the Indonesian public don't approve of our foreign policy direction then no amount of packaging or PR is going to change that. In fact it would be a waste of resources and probably compound the problem of our image in Indonesia if we did.

The aid from Australia to the Indonesian people after the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami shows what can actually be achieved in improving our image abroad. Indeed it would be surprising if the positive attitudes towards the US as a result of its aid effort revealed above were not also replicated in Australia's case. In fact the tsunami shows that it is policy and not public diplomacy that has the greater potential to change the opinions of ordinary Indonesians towards Australia. However that incident also speaks volumes about the lack of a wider political response to terrorism on the part of countries such as the US and Australia. Rather than having developed such policies as part of a deliberate focus of a long-term counter-terrorism strategy, we have to rely on the arrival of a natural disaster and the death of hundreds of thousands of people for us to develop and implement policies that improve the attitudes of Muslim populations towards us. Much more needs to be done.

Getting to know and understand your enemy

The 2004 *Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies* (the Flood Report) recognised that terrorism is an inherently difficult intelligence target, requiring techniques closer to law enforcement and domestic security than to traditional foreign intelligence assessment. Flood found that ASIO's understanding of the 'potentially serious nature' of the threat of terrorism developed more quickly than did that of the foreign intelligence agencies. This could explain why there's such a disproportionate allocation of resources for terrorism analysis, with ASIO devoting far greater efforts than the Office of National Assessments, even though the terrorist threat Australia faces is more foreign than domestic.

While important initiatives in intelligence collection, dissemination and coordination are possible and necessary, the area of intelligence analysis, or understanding the terrorist threat, probably needs the most attention. And more resources and staff, more refined structures and improved processes don't necessarily improve understanding. Australia's efforts to improve our understanding of the terrorist threat in Indonesia should use some law enforcement techniques, such as profiling, which have so far been little utilised in foreign intelligence assessment.

Red teaming terrorism

'Red teaming' is a traditional method used by the military to better understand an enemy. Groups of participants (red teams) play the role of the adversary. Military red teaming has usually been used to test new concepts and capabilities, and has therefore mostly had an operational or capability focus. Red-teaming terrorism would focus mainly on analysis and assessment in order to get a better understanding of the enemy, their tactics and their goals, although it would also have wider applications.

Essentially, red teaming would involve setting up teams of analysts to think like terrorists. Participants would have to be able to 'think outside the box' and be able to pursue their analysis with a fair degree of intellectual freedom. As historian Williamson Murray states, red teaming is one of the better ways to connect intelligence with an understanding of how the enemy might use his capabilities.

While the emphasis would be on analysis, red teaming would also have operational benefits. Red team involvement in counter-terrorist exercising is likely to result in more realistic scenarios, and would expose the wider operational and policy community to new insights and ideas. Red teaming also has a major role to play in training and education. Finally, but more controversially, red teaming can also be used to assess the implications of

major policy decisions. The core principle of red teaming is contestability, so it would require a degree of political courage to set up. Its aim would be to challenge, critically assess and test the assumptions of policy makers.

This could be achieved in a number of ways. A cell could be set up in one of the intelligence or policy areas within government. Another option would be to contract an outside organisation to provide the function, similar to the arrangements in place for the US Defense Adaptive Red Team (DART) Project. Contracted by Hicks & Associates, DART identifies adversaries' possible counters for new concepts and technologies, provides experienced role-players for war games, and conducts experiments that simulate a range of surrogate adversaries, including states and terrorist groups. DART relies on an extensive network of experts in terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, technology exploitation, cultural intelligence, media influence operations, information and communication systems attack, urban operations and war-gaming. Another possible model is the US Army's recently formed Asymmetric Warfare Group which numbers some 200 people and is being deployed in small assessment teams to Iraq to analyse insurgent tactics in that country. Whatever model is used the best way to make red teaming work is to assemble a small group of suitably qualified individuals outside the traditional bureaucracies.

Interviewing terrorists

When Sidney Jones visited Australia last year she stressed how little we understand the individual terrorists who make up JI. She attributed this lack of knowledge partly to a failure to properly interview and analyse the many JI terrorists, at least 300, currently in custody throughout the region. As late as September 2004, the ICG stated that, more than ever, there is a need for an empirical study of the educational backgrounds of known JI members.

Interviews of captured terrorists and storage of their information in databases have long been used in dealing with Middle Eastern terrorism, but the practice doesn't seem to have been used as widely in our region. Where it has been applied, the emphasis seems to have been more on tactical intelligence than on strategic understanding—who the terrorists are, how they were recruited, what motivates them, how they measure success and so on. Once developed, this information could be the basis for a regionally shared database on terrorism.

It's debatable whether Australia should have a high profile role in such a project. It would probably be better to develop the capabilities of Indonesian authorities to gather and collate the information. This could be one of many capacity-building exercises. And it would need to be undertaken on an ongoing basis, not least to ensure that we aren't working on an intelligence picture of a terrorist organisation and motivations that have been overtaken by events. It also provides an opportunity to assess the development of JI terrorists while they remain in prison and would allow authorities to plan on what might happen once the majority are returned back into the mainstream Indonesian community. A recent report by the US–Indonesia Society indicates that 'anecdotal evidence suggests the Indonesian prison system offers little hope of rehabilitating convicted terrorists.'

Understanding the threat

The Australian Government's 2004 Terrorism White Paper contains a number of references to how contemporary terrorism is not easily understood, how hard we find it to comprehend the rhetoric of terrorists and how we can't easily relate to terrorists assertions to a territorial dispute, political ideology or historical injustice. In other words according to the White Paper we simply do not—and possibly cannot—understand modern terrorism

and terrorists. The problem is that if we want to defeat these groups then we're going to have to understand them far better. Of course, understanding them doesn't mean we have to sympathise with them.

One way of better understanding what we are dealing with, be it terrorism or radical Islam, is for the government to develop a program of ongoing academic research into the issues. This could be contracted or tendered out to universities, research institutes or suitably qualified individuals, be they overseas or here in Australia. Such a research program would be overseen by the Office of the Ambassador for Counter-terrorism. Topics for research could include:

- examining the degree that al-Qaeda may have become an ideology rather than an organisation
- analysing how and why suicide terrorism came to be used in Indonesia
- exploring the nature of the rift within JI and what that might mean in practice, and
- assessing the attitudes of the Indonesian people towards radical Islamism.

This would also have the effect of increasing the depth and breadth of expertise on issues of terrorism, Islamism, Middle Eastern studies and the like which would be of further use as the government seeks to expand the experience of our policy and intelligence agencies. Funding such a program would not be inordinately expensive. The government could even go to the extent of considering the possibility of supporting the setting up or funding of an institute located within the region similar to the ASPI. Such an institute would have a similar charter to ASPI, namely to undertake innovative and new research as well as serving a broader public education role on security and strategic issues.

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Building up Indonesia's capabilities

Australia can't defeat JI as a terrorist group. The only country that can do so is Indonesia, and the only institution that can do so is the Indonesian Government. This means that many of the central elements needed to combat JI are out of the control of the Australian Government. Therefore, a priority task of the government should be to enhance the Indonesian authorities' ability to deal effectively with the terrorist threat. The Australian Government currently manages a range of programs in Indonesia, including through Defence, ASIO, the AFP, Attorney Generals' Department, Customs and the Department of Transport and others.

As Australia is gradually moving to re-establish substantial defence relations with Indonesia, attention will naturally focus on the future direction of the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) with the TNI. Currently, our DCP with Indonesia costs less than our DCP with East Timor (in 2004–05, East Timor's allocation was twice that of Indonesia), and it seems that now is the right time to begin its expansion. A reorientation of the DCP towards

greater counter-terrorism cooperation and training is likely, the renewed relationship with KOPASSUS being one obvious example highlighted by the government.

But rather than emphasise a return to ties with KOPASSUS as the focus of military cooperation to combat terrorism the Australian Government has other options. The possible future threat of maritime terrorism as well as the requirement to patrol Indonesia's maritime border and approaches with the Philippines would dictate far greater emphasis on maritime cooperation.

Maritime capability

Earlier this year the Indonesian Navy accepted into service seven new locally-built patrol boats. In 2003 the Indonesian Chief of Navy is reported to have said that the Indonesian Navy ideally required 380 new patrol boats and that at least 200 additional were the minimum required to adequately and effectively patrol Indonesia's maritime approaches. In August 2003 the Minister for Justice Senator Ellison handed over five new patrol boats to the Indonesian National Police as part of a $1.5 million package which included familiarisation training by the AFP. Even more could be done.

Australia has a lot of experience in maritime capacity-building programs through its Pacific Patrol Boat program. While that program may be limited in its application to Indonesia, it does provide something of a guide to what might be achieved, possibly through some multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or APEC. The Australian Defence Minister Robert Hill is recently reported to have told the Shangri-la dialogue in Singapore that the maritime sphere remained an area in which Australia could do more to help the Philippines fight against terrorism. The same principle obviously applies to Indonesia not least given the importance being placed on JI's access to Moro Islamir Liberation Front training camps in the southern Philippines. But the area nominated by Minister Hill, namely maritime surveillance, is a less likely area for cooperation due to probable Indonesian sensitivities of Australian aircraft operating within Indonesian territory. A recent US Congressional Research Service report on terrorism in Southeast Asia observed that Indonesia has nearly a dozen agencies that claim responsibility for guarding Indonesian waters. Therefore Australia could also assist Indonesia in better coordinating its maritime response capabilities, possibly drawing upon Australia's own recently established Joint Offshore Protection Command.

Governance and civic action

Good governance is also at the heart of any successful counter-terrorism program. The lack of it is a cause of terrorism and hinders a counter-terrorist response. Therefore, we should pay attention to governance programs with TNI in areas such as civilian control of the military, the need for parliamentary oversight, the military's role in aid to the civil power and authority, and the like.

While JI isn't an effective insurgency yet, Indonesia is beset by other insurgencies and an inappropriate Indonesian response to such issues could be a factor to widen the appeal of radical Islam. Therefore there's also a strong case to be made to widen the counter-insurgency expertise of TNI, although not necessarily its punitive capability. The development of civic action programs (winning hearts and minds) and a beneficial military role in civilian reconstruction are just two ways that Australia can usefully contribute to stabilising parts of Indonesia. The Indonesian military's involvement in reconstruction in tsunami-ravaged Aceh will go a long way towards assisting to convince Achenese the

benefits of remaining part of the Indonesian Republic. The Australian Army's experience in engineering assistance to remote Aboriginal communities as well as that more recently in Aceh may provide some new directions in defence cooperation. Programs to improve the coordination of counter-insurgency efforts, such as between the police and the TNI, would also be useful. However, we need to take care that improving the military's counter-insurgency capability doesn't lead the Indonesian Government to believe that a military solution is possible or even desirable.

A fair amount of wider capacity-building has been achieved to date, including the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement and the Transnational Crime Centre and the close cooperation on the Bali bombing investigation. The Australian Government has announced its intention to contribute a further $11.8 million over four years from 2005–06 to capacity-building projects in the region. These include the establishment of Bomb Data Centres, the establishment of a Regional Criminal Intelligence Secretariat, and conducting courses in Australia for police from the region.

There's almost no limit to what could be done, but the process by which these projects are decided could probably do with some more structure. One approach might be to institutionalise a cooperation program within the AFP and ASIO, similar to the DCP in the Department of Defence. However, as with public diplomacy projects, part of the problem lies in not having an adequate baseline or starting point, which in this case would be an audit of Indonesian counter-terrorism capabilities. Apparently the US State Department conducted a 'needs assessment' to determine the existing counter-terrorism capabilities of the Indonesian police and to identify future requirements. If it is politically difficult for Australia to be involved in wider capacity-building assessments, they could be promoted through multilateral regional forums such as ASEAN or APEC. Another option would be to pursue future areas for capacity-building through a joint government/academic forum such as a 1.5 track dialogue process. In any event, a fair degree of political sensitivity would be needed in advising Indonesia how to improve its own capabilities.

Intelligence coordination

One area that would benefit from assistance without the need for an audit would be the development and improvement of relations between Indonesia's intelligence agencies. The US 9/11 Commission of Inquiry found that lack of cooperation and coordination between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation led to major lapses in intelligence analysis. Given the degree of rivalry between the Indonesian police, intelligence agencies and TNI, it would be surprising if this isn't the case in Indonesia, where the problem might be even more serious than in the US. There are a number of examples where information handed over to Indonesian authorities by the Australian Government does not seem to have been distributed to all the appropriate Indonesian agencies. One particular case in point seems to be the Australian Government's December 2004 warning of an imminent terrorist attack, possibly targeting Hilton Hotels in Indonesia. At the time of the warning Foreign Minister Downer said Australian officials had discussed the intelligence with Indonesian counterparts yet some Indonesian police officials were quoted as having had no warning about the possible attacks from Australia. Further media reports also indicate that the Hilton hotel chain found out about the warning from journalists.

Australian assistance to Indonesia in this area would need to send the right message. While our own intelligence coordination, particularly between ASIO and the AFP, has greatly improved, we still seem to have a plethora of committees dealing with the problem.

Finally we also need to be aware that expanding our capacity-building efforts may turn those efforts themselves into terrorist targets. Neither al-Qaeda nor JI has mounted any serious counter-counter-terrorist campaign so far. However, the greater the success of our counter-terrorist policies and cooperation with Indonesian agencies, the greater the terrorists' need to combat them. There are already some indications, based on the testimony of the September 2004 bombers of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, that Australian cooperation with the Indonesian police was a prime motivation for that attack.

Showing greater patience in dealing with Indonesia

A lot of the commentary on the Indonesian Government's own response to the terrorist threat from JI has been fairly critical, particularly in its failure to raise public awareness of the terrorist threat. Moreover the Australian Government has, at times, been somewhat public in its vocal criticism of aspects of the Indonesian Government's policies as well as the Indonesian justice system.

A number of events stand out where the Australian Government has taken a particular public stand. These include the failure to take JI seriously before the Bali bombing, the failure to proscribe JI as a terrorist organisation even after Bali, the decision of Indonesia's Constitutional Court to rule anti-terrorism laws unconstitutional and the light sentence handed upon the conviction of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

... it should be understood that the critical audience to appeal to, that will either win or lose this campaign against JI, is not the Australian people, but the people of Indonesia.

In doing so the government obviously wants to be seen by the Australian public as taking the terrorist threat to Australians seriously. Winning hearts and minds is critical in any counter-terrorist campaign, after all the strategy of most terrorist groups is to separate the government from the people they represent. But it should be understood that the critical audience to appeal to, that will either win or lose this campaign against JI, is not the Australian people, but the people of Indonesia. In waging a campaign of winning hearts and minds in the global war on terror the target populations are the Muslim people where terrorists want to set up Islamic regimes, not our own. The fact remains that even Australian Government agencies only really began to take JI seriously after Bali, and given the evidence presented at Ba'asyir's trial its arguable as to whether Australia's own justice system would have done much better.

The jury is still out on whether the Indonesian Government's position of down playing the terrorist threat will turn out to be the right one in the end. It's doubtful that Jakarta's current policy is part of a deliberate approach to deny the terrorists the publicity and awareness they need to sustain their movement and appeal. It is likely the reason the Indonesian Government has not done so has more to do with domestic Indonesian political sensitivities than as part of a comprehensive strategy. However, down playing JI's role and success may actually serve to deny the group the very oxygen they need to thrive and survive at this early stage in their development.

One of the problems associated with the US approach to combating terrorism, not least through the notion that we are engaged in a global war, is that its gives al-Qaeda and other like minded groups a status they simply do not deserve. Terrorists are more than capable of spreading their own message, they don't need our help to further publicise and elevate their role in our fight. A similar Indonesian Government war on terror or even war on JI could actually have the effect of widening the popular support of Islamic extremism.

The US's own 2003 National Strategy to combat terrorism stated that victory in the war on terror will occur when the US and its allies secure a world 'where the threat of terrorist attack does not define our daily lives.' We need to recognise and accept that the way terrorism defines our daily lives has as much to do with our response to terrorism as with the occurrence of terrorist attacks.

The Indonesian Government can't be seen to be acting against JI just because of, or even primarily due to, pressure from foreign countries, especially from the US and Australia. For example acting in ways that widen the belief in Indonesia that Ba'asyir is in prison because of US and Australian pressure would only add to his reputation. The aim of the Australian Government and its programs here should be to undermine the wider support in Indonesia for violent Islamic extremism, particularly with a mind towards future developments, not merely defeating JI.

Australia's criticism of the Constitutional Court verdict bears further exploration. A key element of our counter-terrorism approach in Indonesia would appear to be the encouragement of good governance, the entrenchment of democracy and the like. We shouldn't be in the position of criticising the very process that we are attempting to develop, in this case Indonesian judicial independence from the government. By the same token we should also be wary of over encouraging the Indonesian government to take more drastic legal remedies to combat terrorism such as adopting the internal security legislation common in other Southeast Asian countries. That doesn't mean that such legislation doesn't have its merits, but for a developing democracy such as Indonesia, as opposed to more established democracies such as Singapore and Malaysia, it would come at a time of particular vulnerability. Too drastic a reaction from the Indonesian Government to a terrorist threat, that still pales in comparison to past insurgencies Indonesia has faced, might only fuel the threat.

This doesn't mean we should lay off the Indonesian Government totally either. If that were to occur then the scenario of a future Indonesian President or government that directly encourages the development of extremist ideology and groups referred to earlier (the Pakistan analogy) might also become a reality. Rather it calls for recognition that terrorism can only be defeated over the long term using polices of patience and perseverance. The Australian Government needs to remain aware of the delicate balance between ensuring the Indonesian government takes the threat seriously and pressuring them so far that it causes even greater resentment against Australia in the longer term, both officially and within the greater population. The same principle applies to statements by the Labor opposition.

The recent official Australian Government response to the jailing of those involved in the September 2004 Australian Embassy bombing is a better guide to what our official response should be from now on. Even though those convicted received short sentences the government's statement declared its appreciation for Indonesia's prosecution of those involved. The public Australian response to the recently declared amnesty to some participants in the Bali bombing, including Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, will be another key test of our patience.

Acronyms and abbreviations

ADF	Australian Defence Force
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AMIN	Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusatara Group. The Islamic Holy War Force of the [Indonesian] Archipelago
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
DART	US Defense Adaptive Red Team Project
DCP	Defence Cooperation Program
DI	Darul Islam
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia; Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council
FKAWJ	Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah; Communication Forum for the Adherents of the Prophetic Tradition and the Community
FPI	Front Pembela Islam; Islamic Defenders' Front
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka; Free Aceh Movement
GIA	Armed Islamic Group
GPI	Islamic Youth Movement
GSPC	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
GWOT	global war on terror
ICG	International Crisis Group
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
KMM	Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia
KOPASSUS	Indonesian Special Forces

MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
NII	Negara Islam Indonesia; Islamic State of Indonesia
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang; Crescent Star Party
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; National Revival Party
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party
PKS	Prosperous Justice Party
PPP	Partai Persatuan Perkembanganl; United Development Party
PUPJI	General Struggle Guidelines of Jemaah Islamiyah
SBY	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
TNI	Indonesian military

About ASPI

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is an independent, non-partisan policy institute. It has been set up by the government to provide fresh ideas on Australia's defence and strategic policy choices. ASPI is charged with the task of informing the public on strategic and defence issues, generating new ideas for government, and fostering strategic expertise in Australia. It aims to help Australians understand the critical strategic choices which our country will face over the coming years, and will help government make better-informed decisions.

For more information, visit ASPI's web site at www.aspi.org.au.

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

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

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

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







Local Jihad:
Radical Islam and terrorism in Indonesia

Recent violent radicalism in Indonesia is seen by many as a relatively recent phenomenon, but a closer look at modern Indonesian history shows the inaccuracy of this view.

As much as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) sees itself as being part of a broader global jihadist movement, it also regards itself as the heir to Darul Islam (DI). DI's armed struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia and its members' sacrifice in the name of jihad during the 1950s and 1960s make it an inspiration for JI members today.

The immediate post-Soeharto years were undoubtedly a time of resurgence for Indonesian radicalism. Since late-2002, however, the radical revival has stalled and gone into reverse. JI has been hard hit by the post-Bali bombing crackdown by the Indonesian police and intelligence services. Nonetheless it has shown considerable resilience and capacity for adaptation to this new, and much less congenial, environment.

Using an assessment of the history and future prospects of radical Islam within Indonesia. *Local Jihad* provides a wider understanding of the many disparate groups that represent the radical Islamic community within Indonesia. It concludes that Islamic radicalism has always been a part of Indonesian political and religious life since independence and it is likely to remain so. The more important question is to what extent violence becomes a more regular feature of radical behaviour.

Terrorism might be a global issue but for Australia the threat is inextricably tied up with the problems of the future stability of our neighbours, particularly Indonesia. This ASPI report reveals that while groups like JI may have global links, their motivations, recruiting and operations are inextricably caught up in regional issues. So in addition to our global efforts, we also require a regional strategy tailored to regional solutions.

Local Jihad makes a number of recommendations as to what such a regional strategy might involve including ongoing measurements of Indonesian public attitudes towards Australia; development of a public diplomacy strategy; improving our knowledge base on the terrorists themselves; widening our capacity building efforts with Indonesian agencies; expanding maritime cooperation; improving the coordination of intelligence and exchange of information within Indonesia.

RRP $20.00

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